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REPRESENTATIVE SUITS INVOLVING
NUMEROUS LITIGANTS
CARL C. WHEATONt
The purpose of this study is to present the statutory law of the
United States and England in relation to representative suits in
which the number of persons involved plays a part; to state the
non-statutory law interpreting such statutory law; to give the
writer's construction of the present enactments; and to suggest
the type of law that should be enacted.
THE EXISTING STATE OP THE LAW
The Statutory Law
The usual statute reads as follows: "When the question is one
of a common or general interest of many persons, or where the
parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."'
Slight variations of this statute are:
"If the question involves a common or general interest of many
persons, or if the parties be numerous and it is impracticable to
bring all of them before the court within a reasonable time, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." 2
"... and when the question is one of a common or joint interest
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous and it may be
impracticable to bring them all into court, one or more may sue
or defend for the benefit of the whole.
' 3
".. . and when the question is one of a common or general inter-
tProfessor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
IALA. CODE (1928) §5701 (equity cases); ARiz. REv. CODE (1928) §3736; ARK.
DIG. STAT. (1921) §I098; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §382; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, Watson's Rev. 1926) §277; IOWA CODE (i931) §10974; KAN. REV.
STAT. ANN. (1923) §§60-413; MINN. STAT. (MASON, 1927) §9165; MONT. REv.
CODES (1921) §9083; NED. COUP. STAT. (1929) §20-319;NEv. CoMP. LAWS (1929)
§8558; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1929) c. IO5, §113; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (1920) §195;
N. C. CODE (93) §457; N. D. Coin'. LAWS ANN. (913) §74o6; OHIO GEN.
CODE (THRoCxmORTON, BALDWIN'S REV. 1930) §11257; OKLA. Comp. STAT. ANN.
(1931) §154; ORE. CODE (1930) § 6-io6; PORTO RICO REv. STAT. CODES (CoMP.
1913) §5050; S. C. CODE (1932) Vol. I CODE OF CIV. PROC., §4o6; S. D. Comp.
LAWS (1929) §2315; UTAH CoMP. LAWS (1917) §65IO; WASH. Comp. STAT. (REM-
INGTON, 1932) § 190; WIs. STAT. (1931) C. 260, §12; WYO. REV. STAT. (931)
§89-516. 2KY. CIV. PRAC. CODE (Carroll, 1932) §25.
3ALASKA ComaP. LAWS (1913) §871.
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est of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all, and the court may make an order
that the action be sa prosecuted or defended." 4
Another type of statutes provides for but one situation in which
there may be representative suits. This appears to attempt a com-
bination of the two classes mentioned in the statutes heretofore
quoted. Examples of this kind of legislation are now set forth:
"When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the whole." 5
"When the question raised in a suit is one of common or general
interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
of the class may sue or defend for the whole class." 6
"When the persons who might be made parties shall be very numer-
ous, so that it would be impracticable or unreasonably expensive
to make them all parties, one or more may sue or be sued or may be
authorized by the court to defend for the benefit of all."' 7
"Members of a numerous class may be represented by a few of
the class in litigation which affects the interest of all."8 (This ap-
plies only to equitable proceedings.)
"When the subject-matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."9
"Where there are numerous persons having the same interest
in one cause or matter, one or more of such persons may sue or be
sued, or may be authorized by the court or a Judge to defend in
such cause or matter on behalf or for the benefit of all persons so
interested."' 0
"Where in proceedings concerning a trust a compromise is pro-
posed and some of the persons interested in the compromise are
4CoLo. CODE CIV. PROC. (1921) §12.
6FED. EQ. RULE 38; FLA. CoMp. LAWS (1927) §4918 (7) relating to equity cases.
6DEL. CH. RULE 113. 7CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1930) §5519.
'GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §5415.
9PHILIPPINE CODE CIv. PROC. (1914) §118.
1"RULES OF SUP. CT. ENG. ORDER XVI, RULE 9 (1883). Wood v. McCarthy
(1893) I Q.B. 775, is interpreted bythe annotator of the 1933 edition of "The
Annual Practice" to make "may be authorized" in ORDER 16, RULE 9, to mean
"shall be directed."
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not parties to the proceedings, but there are other persons in the
same interest before the Court, and assenting to the compromise,
the Court or a Judge, if satisfied that the compromise will be for
the benefit of the absent persons, and that to require service on such
persons would cause unreasonable expense or delay, may approve
the compromise and order that the same shall be binding on the
absent persons, and they shall be bound accordingly, except where
the order has been obtained by fraud or non-disclosure of material
facts.""
THE NON-STATUTORY LAw
Source and Purposes of Statutes
The doctrine relating to representative parties which we are
examining appears to have been suggested in an equity case at
least as early as 1701.12 As a result, we should not be surprised to
find the courts saying, as they do, that the source of the statutes
mentioned is equity."
Since their origin is equity, their purposes are naturally said
to be the aims of equity. Thus, some tribunals and authors have
stated that the reason for allowing representative actions is to
avoid a multiplicity of suits. 4 Others say it is to prevent a failure
"RULES OF SUP. CT. ENG. ORDER XVI, RULE 9 (a) (1893). In connection with
ORDER XVI, RULE 9, one should read ORDER I I I, RULE 4, "If plaintiff sues, or
defendant or any of the defendants is sued, in a representative capacity, the
indorsement shall show, in manner appearing by such of the Forms in Appendix
A, Part III, s. VII, as shall be applicable to the case, or by any other statement
to the like effect, in what capacity the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued."
1 2City of London v. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (1701). Perhaps
the first case was Brown v. Vermuden, I Ch. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676).
'
3District No. 21, United Mine Workers of America v. Bourland, 169 Ark.
796,277 S.W. 546 (1925); Mattison v. Demarest, 24 N. Y. Super. Ct. 717, I9 Abb.
Pr. 356 (1863); Frederick v. Douglas Co., 96 Wis. 411, 71 N. W. 798 (1897);
George v. Benjamin, oo Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619, 69 Am. St. Rep. 963 (1893);
30 Cyc. 133; I DEEMER, IOWA PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1927) §6o;
MILLER, PLEADINGAND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF IOWA (5thed.1888) 39; PHILLIPS,
CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929)
§289. Hammond v. Hudson River Iron & M. Co., 2o Barb. (N. Y.) 378 (1855)
says the rule has not been changed by the code.
'
4Prentice v. Duluth Storage and Forwarding Co. et al., 58 Fed. 437 (C.C.A.
8th, 1893); City of Chicago v. Collins et al., 175 Ill. 445, 51 N.E. 907, 49 L.R.A.
4o8 (1898); Whaley v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 154, 61 S. W. 35 (igoi); McCann
v. City of Louisville, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 558, 63 S.W. 446 (I9O1); Brinkerhoff v.
Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 139 (N. Y. 1822); Lentilhon el al. v. Moffat et al., I Edw. Ch.
451 (N. Y. 1832); Guffanti v. National Surety Co., I96 N.Y. 452, 90 N. R. 174
(1909); United Cloak & Suit Designers' Mut. Aid Ass'n of America v. Sigman,
218 App. Div. 367, 218 N. Y. Supp. 483 (ist Dept. 1927); Cavanagh v. Hutche-
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of justice. 5 It is also claimed that convenience is the ground for
permitting them.16 Again, combinations of reasons for the exist-
ence of statutes providing for such actions ar6 given. It has been
suggested that their presence is justified to prevent a practical
failure of justice in extreme cases and to avoid a multiplicity of
suits ;17 to prevent delay and a multiplicity of suits;18 to advance
cohvenience and to overcome the difficulty of bringing all names
of those interested upon the record;19 to advance convenience and
to prevent injustice. 0  I
When Statutes are Applicable
It is usually said that the statutes apply to both legal and equi-
table causes since the language is broad enough to cover both types
of proceedings and neither is expressly excluded.2 But there are
son, I4O Misc. Rep. 178, 250 N. Y. Supp. 227 (1931); In re Chickering, 56 Vt. 82
(1883); Phillips v. Hudson, 2 Ch. App. Cas. 243 (1867); SCHNEIDER, CODE
PLEADING (1926) 8.
16Bouton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375, 7 How. Pr. 198 (N. Y. 1853); Reid
v. The Evergreens, 22 How. Pr. 319 (N. Y. 1861); Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695
(1866); Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (igoi)
A. C. 426; Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swan. Ch. 277, 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (i8it); Milligan
v. Mitchell, 3 Myl. & C. 72, 40 Eng. Rep. 852 (1837); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
(1928) 277; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (ioth ed. 1892) §§96, roo, 12o; Note
(2922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 89.
26March v. Eastern Railroad Co., 40 N. H. 548, (286o); Good v. Blewitt, 13
Ves. Jr. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (2807); Cockburn v. Thompson, x6 Ves. Jr. 322,
33 Eng. Rep. 1105 (i8o9); Harvey v. Harvey, 4 Beav. 215, 49 Eng. Rep. 321
(1841); Powell v. Wright, 7 Beav. 444, 49 Eng. Rep. 1147 (2844); Bunnett v.
Foster, 7 Beav. 54o, 49 Eng. Rep. 1175 (1844); Blain v. Agar, I Sim. 37, 57 Eng.
Rep. 492; Harrisonv. The Marquis of Abergavenny and others, 3 TimesL. R. 324
(2887); The Duke of Bedford v. Ellis et al., (i9oI) A. C. I; BLISS, CODE PLEADING
(3rd ed. 2894) §79; 30 CYC. 132; DANIELS, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE
(6th Am. ed. 2894) 230; KOCHER AND TRIER, NEW JERSEY CHANCERY PRACTICE
AND PRECEDENTS (2924) §52; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254;
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §287; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, §107.
1730 CYC. 133. '3Bryant v. Russell, 23 Pick. 508 (Mass. 1839).
'$Hill v. Kensington Com'rs, I Pars. Eq. Cas. 5o2 (Pa. 185o).
2°Duke of Bedford v. Ellis et al., supra note 16.
2Colt et al. v. Hicks, 179 N. E. 335 (Ind. 1932); Kirk v. Young, 2 Abb. Pr.
453 (N. Y. x856); Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N. E. 735 (1893); Walker
et al. v. Village of Dillonvale, 82 Ohio St. 137, 92 N. E. 220 (igio); BATES, NEW
PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES, AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932)
§78a; 3o Cyc. 134; DEEMER, IOWA PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2927) §60;
KINKEAD, LAW OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE
(2nd ed. 2898) §15; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 2932) § 254; POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 290. Contra: Baskins v. United Mine Workers of
America, 159 Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921); Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf.
657 (N. Y. 1851); Duffyv. Duncan, 32 Barb. 587 (N.Y. x86o).
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statements that, without the aid of legislation, there cannot be
representative actions in suits at law.2 The question arises as to
whether or not a representative action at law is permissible in
the federal courts. 28 U. S. C. § 724 provides that in law cases
in federal district courts the practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding in civil causes shall conforni, as near as may
be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceed-
ing existing in like causes in courts of record of the state within
which such district courts are held. From early to late times it
has been decided that this statute covers the matter of parties.2 1'
There is a strong intimation in a decision by Chief Justice Taft2b
that the Supreme Court of the United States favors allowing suits
by representative parties in suits at law. In that case, which was
one at law, and in which the members of a union consisting of thou-
sands of persons were allowed to be sued in the union's name, he
says, "More than this, equitable procedure adapting itself to mod-
em needs has grown to recognize the need of representation by
one person of many, too numerous to sue or to be sued." Stearns
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle2C was an action in ejectment
tried before the court, the jury having been waived. A few stock-
holders sued on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders.
The court said that since it was apparently impracticable to bring
them all before the court, since the questions involved were common
to all the stockholders, and since their rights rested upon the same
foundation, the suit was authorized by the express provisions of
the state statute, which, apparently, the court felt it should follow.
It must be noticed that the case was tried without a, jury, but,
since the action, as the court expressly states, is one in ejectment,
it is one at law. The fact that the judge, who usually tried equity
actions, heard the case does not change it from an action at law
to a suit in equity. This decision, therefore, seems to support the
jurisdiction of federal courts in representative proceedings .at law.
A dictum in a late decision of a federal district courtld is also per-
tinent to the discussion and clearly states that federal courts should
follow the state law as to allowing the bringing of representative
22Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 15 S.W. 618 (i89o); Coffman v.Sangston, 21
Gratt. Va. 263 (87); (1923) 87 Justice of the Peace 542.
2aBreedlove & Robeson v. Nicolet & Sigg, 32 U. S. 413 (1833); Richter v.
East St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 2o F. (2d) 220 (E. D. Mo. 1927); Alexanderv. Young,
65 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933).
2bUnited Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 42
Sup. Ct. 570,27 A. L. R. 762 (1922). =22I Fed. 590 (C.C.A. 6th, 1915).
="Cherry v. Howell, 4 Fed. Supp. 597 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
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actions at law. The court said: "The action is for fraud and deceit
and to redress the wrong done bondholders as individuals.
"The plaintiffs have attempted to bring the action as a repre-
sentative action, and, as the action is at law, the Act of Conformity
(title 28, section 724, U. S. Code, 28 U. S. C. A. par. 724) applies,
and the statutory procedure of the state governs.
"This is found in section x95 of the Civil Practice Act of the State
of New York, which reads as follows: 'Where the question is one
of a common or general interest of many persons or where the per-
sons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may
be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all.'
"Conforming, as we must, as near as may be, to the practice
and procedure of the courts of the state, the construction of the
state law by its courts is binding upon the courts of the United
States. Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company v. Hopkins, 94 U. S.
I, 13, 24 L. Ed. 48.
"The most common application of section 195 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, supra, is to suits in equity, but it may also apply to suits
at law, Kirk v. Young, 2 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 453; Atkins v. Trow-
bridge, 162 App. Div. 629, 148 N. Y. S. 181; but a class action
is not proper for fraud or deceit, Dykman v. Keeney, 154 N. Y.
483, 48 N. E. 894; Marsh v. Kaye, 168 N. Y. 196, 61 N. E. 177;
Brown v. Werblin, 138 Misc. 29, 244 N. Y. S. 209, 212; Cavanagh
v. Hutcheson, 140 Misc. 178, 25o N. Y. S. 127; and neither do
Kirk v. Young, supra, nor Atkins v. Trowbridge, supra, furnish
authority for the bringing of a class action for fraud or deceit.
"The situation of the plaintiff in the action at bar cannot be better
described than in the words used by Mr. Justice Walsh, in Brown
v. Werblin, supra, wherein he said: 'Nor do the provisions of section
195, Civil Practice Act, permit the bringing of this action. A repre-
sentative action cannot be maintained unless it appears from the
allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff not only has a cause
of action but that he is representative of a common or general
interest of others. Bouton v. Van Buren, 229 N. Y. 17, 127 N. E.
477. Here there is neither community of right or interest in the
subject-matter of the action nor in the questions of law or fact
involved. Each plaintiff has a several right to recover, in an action
at law, the damage, if any, sustained by reason of defendants' fraud.
Each plaintiff's action is necessarily predicated upon the facts
which induced him to act. The right of each individual is not deriva-
tive. It must stand on allegations and proof peculiar to itself and
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disassociated from others. None has an interest in the cause of
action or the damage recoverable by another. In such a case a class
action may not be maintained.'"
The result of these opinions definitely indicates that the federal
courts, as far as they have spoken on the matter, believe that the
state law as to representative suits should be applied in those courts
in actions at law. Suggestions are found that tort cases are not
covered by the statutes we are discussing.E However, a very large
number of cases deciding the other way is discovered, which fact
will be disclosed hereafter. We find at least one direct statement
that representation is not permitted where the purpose of the action
is to impose personal liability or to require some positive act.24
The clear result is that defendants may be sued by representation,
for the statutes do not distinguish between plaintiffs and defend-
ants.2 But it does not authorize new causes of action,8 or enlarge
the courts' jurisdiction.27 The statutes have been held to apply
not only to the usual cases before courts, but to proceedings before
commissions.2 8  The representative statute applies though another
"Cavanagh v. Hutcheson, 140 Misc. 178 250 N. Y. Supp. X27 (I93I); Tem-
perton v. Russel, I. Q. B. 435 (i893); Mercantile Marine Service Ass'n v. Toms
et al.,,(I916) 2 K. B. 243.
24MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929) §242.
"United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n of California et al., 85 Fed. 252 (N. D.
Cal. 1898); State v. Webb, 97 Ala. iii, 12 So. 377 (1893); Baskins v. United
Mine Workers of America, ISo Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921); Wheelock v.
First Presbytdrian Church, I 9 Cal. 477, 5I Pac. 841 (1897); Herald v. Glendale
Lodge No. 1289 B. P. 0. E., 46 Cal. App. 325, i89 Pac. 329 (1920); Adams v.
Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642, io Ann. Cas. 774 (19o6); Pearson v. Anderburg,
28 Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307 (19o5); Van Brunt v. Wisconsin Consistory Home Ass'n,
163 Wis. 540, I58 N. W. 295 (1916); Wood v. McCarthy, I Q. B. 775 (1893);
Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (x9oi) A. C.
426; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (Ioth ed. 1892) §16. This is also true under case
law. Chicago Typographical Union No. I6 v. A. R. Barnes & Co. ef al., 134 Ill.
App. ii (1907); Maisch v. Order of Americus, 223 Pa. 199, 72 Atl. 528 (1909);
Wolfe et al. v. Limestone Council No. 373, etc., 233 Pa. 357, 82 Atl. 499 (1912);
Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen et al., 271 Pa.
419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921); Dewey v. St. Albans Trust Co., 60 Vt. I, 12 Atl. 224
(1888); Brown v. Vermuden, I Chan. Cas. 272, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (1676); Long
v. Yonge, 2 Sim. 369, 57 Eng. Rep. 827 (1830).
"Asplund v. Hannett, 249 Pac. io74 (N. M. 1926); PoMERoY, CODE REMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929) §287.
27Asplund v. Hannett, supra note 26.
2
'Southern Hardware Jobbers' Ass'n et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 290
Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal
Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); (1926) 25 MICH. L. REV.
184.
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statute provides for suit by the president or treasurer of the organ-
ization on behalf of whose members an action is brought.9
Are the Statutes Mandatory?
Although the words "may sue or defend" are ordinarily used in
the statutes and rules of court now under consideration, it is usually
said that where representation of parties is possible it is necessary.30
Story suggests that this is true because the court is solicitous to
attain the purposes of substantial justice.' We find this mandatory
doctrine applied to actions by creditors against stockholders to
enforce the latters' liability for corporation debts;32 by creditors
to enforce the statutory liability of incorporators to creditors;12
by shareholders to restrain an illegal act by the corporation; by
partners in relation to a partnership matter; 5 by creditors to carry
into effect an assignment for the benefit of creditors;3 by creditors
to set aside a transfer in fraud of creditors; 37 by creditors to prevent
and redress any maladministration or fraud against creditors, con-
29Bloete v. Simon, i9 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 88 (1887). See also BATES, NEW
PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FoRMs UNDER THE CODE (4th ed.) 1932, §8o.
"°Roberts v. Kennedy, 13 Del. Ch. i33, 116 Atl. 253 (1922); Penn v. Craig,
3 Y. & C. Ex. 216, 16o Eng. Rep. 68o (1838); STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (Ioth
ed. 1892) §§ 96, 107, x31a; WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE (1915) §59.3
nSTORY, EQUITY PLEADING (ioth ed. 1892) §96.
DPollard v. Bailey, 87 U. S. 520 (1874); Terry v. Little, ioi U. S. 216, I Sup.
Ct. 432 (i88o); Pattersonv. Lynde, io6 U. S. 5i9, I Sup. Ct. 432 (1883); Handley
v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, ii Sup. Ct. 530 (x89o); New Orleans Pacific Railway Co.
et al. v. Parker et at., 143 U. S. 42, 12 Sup. Ct. 364 (1892); Geo. W. Signor
Tie Co. v. Monett & S. W. Const. Co. et al., 198 Fed. 412 (E. D. Mo.
1912); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Kinnicutt, 248 Fed. 596 (S. D. N. Y. 1917);
Crease et al. v. Babcock et al., io Metc. 532 (Mass. 1846); Wright v. McCormack
17 Ohio St. 86 (x866); Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113 (1866). It has been
said that the reason for this result is that the stockholder's liability is to pay his
proportion of the corporation's debts, and it is essential that the action be brought
in such a form that each stockholder should pay a sum into a fund to be paid to
all the creditors. Handley v. Stutz and George W. Signor Tie Co. v. Monett &
S. W. Const. Co. et al., supra this note.
3Hessler eal. v. Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co. et al., 6i Ohio St. 621, 56
N. B. 469 (igoo).
34Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St. 341, 62 N. E. 327 (i9oi); White v. Carmarthen &
Co., I Hem. & M. 786, 71 Eng. Rep. 344 (1863).
3 Baldwin v. Lawrence, 2 Sim. & S. i8 (1824); Macbride v. Lindsay, 9 Hare
574 (1852).
36Bryant v. Russell, supra note I8. Wakeman v. Grover, 4 Paige 23 (N. Y.
1832); STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, (ioth ed. 1892) §99. Here Story says the
reason for the result is that the debtor's representative might otherwise be com-
pelled to account de novo with all the other creditors in other bills.37Bishop v. Cowden, 5 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 151 (Pa. 1889).
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templated or executed, where there is a voluntary liquidation of
a national bank;3 8 by creditors to marshal assets of a deceased and
to obtain their administration;39 by creditors against one who
is liable for obligations of a debtor up to a certain amount;40 and
by a crew to obtain an accounting of prize money. 41 There are
a few cases holding that the statutes and rules of court now being
examined are not mandatory.42 Again, some courts have decided
that the bringing of a class suit is, or is not, permitted within the
court's discretion." It has been said that one suing as a representa-
tive sues for himself and claims nothing in behalf of those repre-
sented unless they choose to come in and make their claimsA'
"A Question of Common or General Interest of Many Persons"
One of the most baffling problems of code pleading is what is
meant by a question of common or general interest of many per-
sons. Let us first examine the ideas of legal writers as to the import
of "common or general interest". Some courts say that those simi-
larly situated45 may be represented. We find this expression in an
action by property owners to enjoin the collection of taxes ;46 in a suit
38Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887).
3
'Stephenson v. Taverners, 9 Gratt. 398 (Va. 1852); Worraker v. Pryer, 2 Ch.
D. io9 (1876); I DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (6th Am. ed.
1894) 231. 4"Bell v. Mendenhall, 71 Minn. 331,73 N. W. io86 (1898).
41 Leigh v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sr. 312 (1751). Of course, it must be noticed that
in this case, and a few others mentioned, the result was based on case law of the
same, or very nearly similar, wording as is found in legislation and rules of court.
"Adams v. Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642, iO Ann. Cas. 774 (19o6); Thorn-
ton et at. v. Hightower, 17 Ga. I (1855); Way v. Bragaw el at., 16 N. J. Eq. 213
(x863); Terry v. Calnan, 4 S. C. 508 (1873).
43Sparks v. Robinson, 335 Ky. 453, 74 S. W. 176 (19o3); Pencille v. State
Farmers' Hail Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 67, 76 N. W. 3026 (3898); Faber v. Faber, 76
S. C. 156, 56 S. E. 677 (1907). Contra: 30 Cyc. 133-134. Under Order I6, rule
9 of the English Rules of Court it has been declared that there may be a class
suit as to plaintiffs, but not as to defendants, without an order of court. Fair-
field Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. London and East Coast etc. Co.
Ltd., (1895) W. N. 64; Walker v. Sur e at., (1914) 2 K. B. 930; (1923) 87 Justice
Peace 543. Contra as to defendants: Graham v. Cadogen etc., (19o6) W. N. 12.
44Fish v. Howland, I Paige 20 (N. Y. 1828).
45Bogert et at. v. Southern Pac. Co., 29o Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Burt v.
British Nation Life Assurance Ass'n, 4 De G. & J. 158, 45 Eng. Rep. 62 (1859).
"8Risley et at. v. City of Utica el al., 173 Fed. 5o2 (N. D. N. Y. 3909); Ever-
glades Drainage League et al. v. Napoleon B. Broward Drainage Dist. ef al.,
253 Fed. 246 (S. D. Fla. 1918); Matheny et al. v. Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361 (1856);
Trustees of Jackson Township et al. v.Thoman et at., 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N. E.
523 (1894). A dictum in this last case says the result is contra in an action to
recover back taxes illegally and involuntarily paid.
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by a city and traffic associations representing their citizens and
clients to enjoin the enforcement of freight rates;47 in a case by
stockholders to have the defendants restore corporate property
improperly taken;48 in an injunction proceeding by property owners
against a nuisance, 9 and in a case by manufacturers and sellers
of fertilizers to be relieved from carrying out an order of a Commis-
sioner of Agriculture to attach tags to packages of fertilizer.50 Other
expressions of like import which are used are similar interests5' and
same interests.52
It has been stated that there must be a common interest in the
matter involved,53 but that such common interest need not be similar,4
or identical.5 We also find the term community of interest employed."
Again, a common 7 or general (homogeneous) 8 right has been held
necessary.
Up to this point the terminology used has not been definite enough
to be of much value in explaining the phrase with which we are
dealing, except as we apply it to the facts concerning which it is
used. Now, however, we turn to something more definite. Thus,
we find it said that to permit a representative suit, "there must
be community of interest, as well as a right of recovery, by reason
of the same essential facts."59 Again, it is claimed that it is sufficient
47Merchants' & Manufacturers' Traffic Ass'n etc. v. United States et al.,
231 Fed. 292 (N. D. Cal. 1915).
4'Atlanta Real Estate Co. v. Atlanta National Bank, 75 Ga. 4o (1885).49Greer v. Smith, 155 App. Div. 420, 14o N. Y. Supp. 43 (2nd. Dept. 1913).
5flanton v. Southern Fertilizing Co., 77 Va. 335 (1883).
5
'Blain v. Agar, I Sim. 37, 57 Eng. Rep. 492 (1826).
52Powell v. Wright, 7 Beav. 444,49 Eng. Rep. 1137 (1844).
CHill et al. v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co., 219 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
"Crease et al. v. Babcock et al., io Metc. 525 (Mass. 1846); State v. Dist.
Ct. etc., 300 Pac. 544 (Mont. 1931). In speaking of cases relating to members of
voluntary associations as defendants, Story in his EQurrT PLEADING (ioth ed.
1892) §116, says the interests of those representing and represented must be of
a common character and responsibility.
6sSpear et al. v. H. V. Greene Co. et al., 246 Mass. 259, I4O N. E. 795 (1923).
6Evans v. Stokes, I Keen, 24,48 Eng. Rep. 215 (1836); BATES, NEW PLEADING,
PRACTICE, PARTIES, AND FoiusS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932) §8Ia.
67Howard-Sevier Road Improvement District No. I v. Hunt, 166 Ark. 62,
265 S. W. 517 (1924); Harmon et al. v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122,
13 N. E. 16I (1887); Whitmore v. N. Y. Interurban Water Co., 158 App. Div.
178, 142 N. Y. Supp. lO98 (2nd. Dept. 1913).
68Stevenson v. Austin, 3 Metc. 474 (Mass. 1842).
5 Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N. E. 1058 (I9O5).
Accord: BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMs UNDER THE
CODE (4th ed. 1932) §8Ia.
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if there is a common interest in the question of law involved,60 or in the
question to be tried,6' which probably refers to the legal question
just mentioned, but there are cases contrary to this.6 2 Some courts
declare that, to permit a representation, all involved need only have
a common interest in the facts and law, 63 or in the samefacts and issues,6
which probably means the same thing. Professor Blume is decidedly
of this opinion.'5 Professor McIntosh more vaguely says there
must be some community of interest in the question presented.6
Still others have decided that there must be relief sought which is
beneficial to all,6 7 or that there must be an object common to all.6 8
Then there are those who declare that certain combinations involv-
ing the things just mentioned constitute the "question" involved.
We discover them saying there must be a common interest in the
question involved and in the relief requested,69 in the legal question and
relief sought,70 in the same cause or matter and relief sought,7' in the
questions of law and fact and in the subject matter.7 2 We are also in-
6
"Harwarden v. Y. & L. Coal Co., III Wis. 545, 87 N. W. 472, 55 L. R. A. 828
(igoi); In re Calgary and Medicine Hat Land Co. Ltd., (Igo8) 2 Ch 652.
GLibby v. Norris, 142 Mass. 246,7 N. E. 919 (1886).
61Oswald et al. v. Morris, 92 Ky. 48, 17 S. W. 167 (1891); Nairin v. Kentucky
Heating Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 551, 86 S. W. 676 (19o9); Union Light, Heat & Power
Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S. W. lO81 (1917); 30 Cyc. 137-138.63Chew et al. v. First Presbyterian Church of Wilmington, 237 Fed. 219 (Del.
1916); Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505, 264 Pac. 1115 (1928); Smith v. Bank
of New England, 69 N. H. 254, 45 Atl. 1082 (1898). I POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. I918) §269. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §286
probably means the same thing where it says the common interest must be in the
matter at issue. Contra: Turner et al. v. City of Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132
(1902); Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 244 Ky. 486, 5I S. W. (2d) 473 (1932).
4United Cloak etc. v. Sigman, 218 App. Div. 367, 218 N. Y. Supp. 483 (Ist
Dept. 1927).
"Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Repre-
sentative Suits (1932) 30 MICH. L. REV. 878-9o4.
6MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929) §242.
"7Bull et al. v. Read et al., 13 Gratt. 78 (Va. 1855); Gray v. Caplin, Sim & S.
267, 57 Eng. Rep. 348 (1825).
'
8Baker v. Portland, Fed. Cas. No. 777 (Ore. 1879); Durburow et al. v. Niehoff
et al., 37 Ill. App. 403 (189o); March v. Eastern R. R. Co., 4o N. H. 548 (186o);
Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & C. 134,41 Eng. Rep. 53.
69Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster et at., 26 Misc. 338, 57 N. Y. Supp. 14o
(1899). 7 0Skinner v. Mitchell, io8 Kan. 861, 197 Pac. 569 (1921).
7'Markt & Co. Limited v. Knight S. S. Co. Limited (191o) 2 K. B. 1o21. In
Hill v. Kensington, I Pars. Eq. Cas. 5o (Pa. 185o) it is stated in a dictum that all
who have similar interests and a beneficial interest in the relief sought may be
represented.
72Osborne v. Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 43 Fed. 824 (C. C. W. D. Wis. i89o).
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formed that a community of interest in the questions of law and fact
or in the relief demanded suffices,7 3 but there is an opposing opinion
saying that it is necessary that those represented must have "a
common interest in the subject matter of the suit and a right and
interest to ask for the same relief," and that such an interest in the
questions of law and fact orinthe relief demanded will not suffice. 4
It has been claimed that the common interest involved in a repre-
sentative suit should be in the defendant's misdeed,7 6 or in the cause
of complaint.7 6
We now come to a very important list of authorities who hold
that there can be a representation of plaintiffs only when those
suing and those represented could sue jointly." The only reason
that seems to be given for this result is that, in effect, the action
is brought by all the parties.78 A very able article has been written
by Professor Blume opposing this view.79 His argument is that,
in determining whether or not those involved in representative
suits must be able to join, one should look only to the statutory
provisions dealing with such suits, and nothing stated in them
makes it necessary that those representing and represented have to
be able to join.
A court believing that there can be no representative action in
tort cases has claimed that all those involved in such a proceeding
must have claims arising out of the same contract and that there must
be a limited fund out of which all are to recover.80
3Commonwealth v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252,65 S. W. 596, 55 L. R. A. 597 (1901).
74Spear et al. v. H. V. Greene Co. et al., 246 Mass. 259, 14o N. E. 795 (1923).
75Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, supra note 16.
76U. S. Smelting Co. v. Hofkin et al., 245 Fed. 896 (E. D. Pa. 1917).
"Certia v. University of Notre Dame, 82 Ind. App. 542, Ii N. E. 318 (1923);
Holland Oil & Gas Co. et al. v. Holland, 114 Kan. 863, 220 Pac. 1044 (1923);
Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, 1O3 N. Y. Supp. 822
(1907); Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657 (N. Y. 1851); Glidden et al. v.
Cincinnati, 4 S. and C. P. D. 428,3o Weekly Cin. L. B. 213 (1896); BATES, NEW
PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FoRmS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932)
§8Ia; BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) §79; MILLER, PLEADING AND PRAC-
TICE IN COURTS OF IOWA (5th ed. 1888); PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932)
§254; WATSON'S WORKS' INDIANA PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND FORMS
(4th ed. 1918-1922) §247. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §287 says a
representative suit cannot be sustained unless it could have been maintained if
all the "many" persons had been joined as co-parties, or unless it could have been
maintained by each of them suing separately for himself.
78Certia v. University of Notre Dame, supra note 77.
79Blume, The "Common Qyestions" Principle in the Code Provision for Repre-
sentative Suits (1932) 3o MICE. L. R., 878-904.
8 Cavanagh v. Hutcheson, 140 Misc. 178, 25o N. Y. Supp. 127 (1931).
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Finally, we discover many opinions in which it is stated that
the "common or general interest" with which this article deals must
be in the subject matter of the suit. 81 This brings up the whole question
as to the meaning of "subject matter." That phrase is probably
synonymous with "subject of the action." For a detailed discussion
of the meaning of that term one may see a recent article by the
author.82 The United States Supreme court has further explained
the first sentence of this paragraph as meaning it is essential that
there be a community of interest growing out of the nature
and condition of the right in dispute.83 The Supreme Court of
Colorado has said the "subject matter" mentioned is the legal
right of the persons interested in the representative suit.M There
are some instances in which it is said that there must be a proprietary
interest involved."' This may be meant to be a limited application
of the "subject matter" rule. One comparatively late case says
there must be the common interest in the subject matter and in
the relief requested. 8
It is very clearly pointed out by a few writers that the interest
with which the representative statutes deal is a common, as opposed
to a united, interest.87 The late Professor Hepburn said this was
so because another type of statute said that those united in inter-
est must be joined.88
One author calls to our attention the fact that more than one
class may be represented if the question is one of common interest
to several classes. 89
81Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262 (1897); Cutting v. Gilbert
et al. Fed. Cas. No. 3519 (S. D. N. Y. 1865); Turner et al. v. City of Mobile, 135
Ala. 731, 33 So. 832 (I902); Speyer v. School Dist. No. I, City and County of
Denver, 82 Colo. 534, 268 Pac. 859 (8928); Thomas v. Kentucky Trust and Se-
curity Co., 156 Ky. 26o, I6o S. W. 8037 (1913); Union Heat, Light & Power Co.
v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S. W. io81 (1917); Batman v. Louisville Gas &
Electric Co., 187 Ky. 659, 220 S. W. 318 (1920); Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 244
Ky. 486, 51 S. W. (2d) 473 (932); State v. Dist. Court of the First Judicial
Dist. in and for Lewis and Clark Co. et al., 300 Pac. 544 (Mont. 1931); 1 WHITE-
HOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE (1915) §59- Contra. Commonwealth v. Scott, 112 Ky.
252, 65 S. W. 596, 55 L. R. A. 597 (8908).
82Wheaton, Statutory Use of the Term "Subject of Action" (1932) 18 CORNELL
LAw QUARTERLY 35-50. 8nScott v. Donald, supra note 81.
'"Speyer v. School Dist. No. i, City and County of Denver, supra note 81.
OTemperton v. Russell (893) I Q. B. 435; Wing et al. v. Burn et al., 44 Times
L. R. 258 (1928). Contra: Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, (igoi) A. C. I.
8 Spear et al. v. H. V. Greene Co. et al., 246 Mass. 259, 14o N. E. 795 (1923).8 Day v. Buckingham, 87 Wis. 215, 58 N. W. 254 (8894); George v. Benjamin,
oo Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619 (1898). 8830 CYc. 134.
8 9KINKEAD, LAW OF PLEADING IN CiviL ACTIONS AND DEFENCES UNDER THE
CODE (2d ed. 1898) §15.
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Properly, or improperly, many have said that the usual statutes
which we are examining are to be divided into two parts.89 a The
first division, they remark, deals with instances when the question
is one of a common or general interest of many persons, while the other
one permits representation when the parties are numerous and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court. The result has been
that such courts have made a distinction between many and numer-
ous persons.
We must, therefore, see what numbers have, and have not, been
held "many" and "numerous". There is much confusion in the
result. As few as three9" or four9' persops have been said to be
"many". On the other hand, four have been held not to be sufficient
under the first division. 92 As the aggregate of those involved increases
the uncertainty disappears. Thus, one hundred thirty-eight have
been said to be "many".93 It has been stated that "many", when
used in connection with "common or general interest", means a
limited number, and that the character of the interest of the per-
sons involved, rather than their number, controls.14 It is asserted
that under the common interest clause those interested in represent-
ing and being represented need not be numerous, and it need not
be impracticable to bring them all before the court.95
Now, when are persons "numerous", so that there may be a
representative suit of the alleged second class of actions where
some sue for themselves and others? Where there are a hundred
or more interested, the courts have no difficulty in saying they
are "numerous".9" Nor do they hesitate to say three97 or five98
soaSee what such a scholar as the late Chas. M. Hepburn says, 30 Cyc. 135.
90McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, ii Barb. 516 (N. Y. 1851); Hilton Bridge
Const. Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338,57 N. Y. Supp. 14O (1899).
O1Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 54 Misc. 152, IO3 N. Y. Supp 822,
(1907). 92Farley v. Alderson, Igo Ky. 632,227 S. W. 1005 (1921).
9
"Blair v. Shelby County Agricultural & Joint Stock Ass'n, 28 Ind. I75 (1867).
"Farnam v. Barnum, 2 How. Pr. N. S. 396 (N. Y. 1885); CLARK,,CObE PLEAD-
ING (1928) pp. 278-279; 30 Cyc. 135.
95McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, supra note go; George v. Benjamin, IOO Wis. 622,
76 N. W. 619, 69 Am. St. Rep. 963 (1898); KINKEAD, LAW OF CIvIL AcTIONs
AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2d ed. 1898) §15; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING
(2nd ed. 1932) §254; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §286.
9 Florence v. Helms, 136 Cal. 613, 69 Pac. 429 (19o2) (about 200); Chicago
Typographical Union No. 16 v. A. R. Barnes & Co. et al., 134 I. App. II (1907)
(about 2800); Pencille v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 67, 76
N. W. 1020, 73 Am. St. Rep. 326 (1898) (about 3500); Gibson v. American Loan
& Trust Co., 58 Hun 443, 12 N. Y. Supp. 444, (189o) (about i5o); Whiting v.
Elmira Industrial Ass'n, 45 App. Div. 349, 6I N. Y. Supp. 27 (4th Dept. 1899)
(several hundred); Kinney and Dix v. Pocock et al., Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 121, 19
PLURAL LITIGANTS IN CLASS SUITS
are not "numerous". But in between these figures there is no una-
nimity. Thus, twenty,9 9 twenty-five, l"' twenty-eight, 0 1 thirty-
five,102 thirty-seven,' about fifty,0 4 about sixty,' and over seventy-
five08 have been said to be "numerous". On the other hand, twenty,07
thirty-one, 0 8 thirty-five, 09 thirty-five to forty,"0 and more than
forty"' have been held not to be "numerous".
It should be carefully noticed that part of the ordinary statute
which we are now studying states that there may be a representative
suit when "the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court." Because of this wording, many say
that parties are "numerous" only when there are so many of them
that it would be impracticable to join them individually."2 There
are many decisions that, by inference, hold, rather, that those
interested must be "numerous" and it must be impracticable to
bring them all before the court. Moreover, there is at least one
Ohio Dec. 354 (1908) (about iioo); Tobin v. Portland Flouring Mills Co., 41
Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743 (1902); Stemmermann v. Lilienthal, 54 S. C. 440, 32 S. E.
535 (1899) (about 200); Coffman v. Sangston et al., 21 Gratt. 263 (Va. 1871)
(between 400 and 500); Perkins et al. v. Seigfried's Admr., 97 Va. 444, 34 S. E.
64 (1899) (over 400); St. Germain v. Bakery and Confectionery Worker's Union
etc., 97 Wash. 282, I66 Pac. 665, L. R. A. 1917F 824 (about 500); Preston v.
Grand Collier Dock Co., II Sin. 327, 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (184o) (over a hundred);
Gordon v. Pym, 3 Hare 223, 67 Eng. Rep. 364 (1843) (about 15o); Mayor and
Corporation of Norwich v. Brown el al., 48 L. T. (N. S.) 898 (1883) (2000 to
3000); Wood v. McCarthy (1893) 1 Q. B. 775 (nearly 4000).
"7Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster, supra note 69; Bear v. American Rapid
Tel. Co., 36 Hun (N. Y.) 400 (1885).
"Cassidy v. ShimMin, 122 Mass. 406 (1877).
"Harvey v. Harvey, 4 Beav. 215,49 Eng. Rep. 321 (1841).
"OLibby v. Norris, 142 Mass. 246, 7 N. E. 919 (I886).
"'IStimson et al. v. Lewis et al., 36 Vt. 91 (1863).
1"McCaleb v. Crichfield, 52 Tenn. 288 (1871).
10Milbank v. Collier, I Coll. 237, 63 Eng. Rep. 300 (1844).
"
4Hendrix, etc. v. Money etc., 64 Ky. 306 (1866).
"'Cullen v. Duke of Queensberry, i Bro. C. C. 101, 28 Eng. Rep. ioul (1781).
0'Hodgesv. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464,8o N. W. 726 (x899).
"'7Harrisonv. Stewardson, 2 Hare 530, 67 Eng. Rep. 219 (1842-3).
"'8George v. Benjamin, zoo Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619 (1898).
"0'Kirk v. Young, 2 Abb. Pr. 453 (N. Y. i856).
"'Bird v. Lanphear, i IApp. Div. 613,42 N. Y. Supp. 623 (4th Dept. 1896).
"'Brainerd v. Bertram, 5 Abb. N. C. io2 (N. Y. 1878).
"2Bacon ef al. v. Robertson et al., 18 How. (U. S.) 48o (1856); Commodores
Point Terminal el al. v. Hudnall ef al., 283 Fed. I5o (1922); Conroy v. Cover et al.,
80 Colo. 434, 252 Pac. 883 (1927); Whitney v. Mayo, 15 Ill. 251 (1853); Liggett
v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89,21 Pac. 133 (I888); Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S. C. 29, 65 S. E.
953 (igo9); Dewey v. St. Albans Trust Co., 6o Vt. I, 12 Atl. 224 (1888); Perkins
ef al. v. Seigfried's Admr., 97 Va. 444, 34 S. E. 64 (1899); Board of Supervisors
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instance in which it is said that, where it is practicable to unite a
large number, a representative suit will not lie."1
This logically leads to the question as to the meaning of "im-
practicable" when that word is used in connection with these types
of holdings. The United States Supreme Court has said, in effect,
that such impracticability exists when the parties concerned are
so great in number that "their rights and liabilities are so subject
to change and fluctuation by death, or otherwise, that it would
not be possible without very great inconvenience to make all of
them parties, and would oftentimes prevent the prosecution of
the suit to a hearing."'14 This general idea has been applied in
several decisions. The notion seems to be that it is unfair to demand
the actual joinder by name of a large number of persons as parties
since it would be difficult to ascertain all their names and resi-
dences,"5 to add to the record the names of representatives of the
original parties who might die during the proceeding,"' or to replace
those who were, in the first instance, named as parties with the ven-
dees of their interests which were sold after the commencement of
the action."7
We find it stated that the court will not assume that it is imprac-
ticable to bring in parties because they are numerous. On the other
hand, there may be a representative suit no matter how many persons
are concerned."8
Under the'Rules of the Supreme Court of England, which provide
for only one class of representative suits in which the number of
persons interested is important, it has been declared that five persons
are not numerous enough to permit a representative action, unless
of Douglas Co. v. Walbridge et al., 38 Wis. i79 (1875) (dictum); Weld v. Bonham,
2 Sim. & S. 91 (1824); Wallwroth v. Holt, 4 Myl. & C. 619, 4 Eng. Rep. 238
(1841); Hawkins v. Hawkins, I Hare 543, 66 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1842); Commis-
sioners of Sewers of London v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 6Io (1876); Mayor etc. of Nor-
wich v. Brown et al., 48 L. T. (N. S.) 898 (1883); Wood v. McCarty (1893) i Q. B.
775; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (ioth ed. 1892) §95.
n1Tobin v. Portland Flouring Mills Co., 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743 (1902).
(There were ioi persons involved, but they were all readily available).
U4Smith et al. v. Swormstedt et al., I6 How. (U. S.) 288 (1853).
11Prentice v. Kimball, 19 Ill. 319 (1857); Coffman v. Sangston, 21 Gratt. 263
(Va. 1871).
"Wilmer v. Atlanta & R. Air Line Ry. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 17, 776 (N. D. Ga.
1875); Bushong v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 66o (1884); Pearson v. Anderburg, 28 Utah
495, 80 Pac. 307 (I9O5); Bromley v. Williams, 32 Beav. 177, 55 Eng. Rep. 6g
(x863); BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FoRms UNDER THE
CODE (4th ed. 1932) §80. "'BATEs, id.
usCastle et ai. v. City of Madison et al., I13 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. I56 (1902).
(There were 256 involved here).
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the amount in question is very small, or unless the court is satisfied
that all the other parties wished the question to be determined in the
presence of the one.119
The statutes under investigation, which appear to provide for
two classes of cases, do not directly say that under the imprac-
ticable clause the parties representing and represented must have
any common interest. It is very important to know whether
or not they need to have it. A few authorities say none has to
exist.120 But the great majority of opinions is the other way.'
Under Federal Equity Rule 38, which only provides for one type
of class suit, there must be a question common to so many
that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the
court.1' There is very little reasoning used in reaching this result,
the courts being satisfied to state their conclusions. The late Dean
Hepburn, however, was not satisfied with just giving an unreasoned
decision, but stated further,".. . the same facts of the cases which
recognize and apply the exception all show some interest in common
among the parties represented. The established doctrine in equity
recognized it as essential that there should be at least 'a common
interest, or a common right.., or a general claim or privilege'; and
the fundamental tenets of sound procedure require it.""12 Pomeroy
says, "The language does not in terms require any question of com-
mon, or general interest to this great number, but it is difficult to
conceive of an action in which a very large number of persons
should be capable of joining as plaintiffs-so large that it would be
impracticable to bring them all actually before the court-unless
the question to be determined was one of common or general
interest to them all.''2
11Blain v. Agar, I Sir. 37, 57 Eng. Rep. 492 (1826); Braybrook v. Wright, 6o
Sol. J. &R., 307 (1916).
12McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, ii Barb. S16 (N. Y. 1851) (perhaps, by dictum);
George v. Benjamin, ioo Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619 (1898) (dictum); I DEEMER,
IOWA PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1927) §60; KINKEAD, LAW OF PLEADING
IN CiviL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2nd ed. 1898) §i5.
12Smith et al. v. Swormstedt et al., supra note 114; Ayres ef al. v. Carver et al.,
17 How. (U. S.) 591 (1854); Batman v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 187 Ky.
659, 220 S. W. 318 (1920); Lile el al. v. Kefauver el al., 244 Ky. 486, 51 S. W.
(2d) 473 (1932); Platt v. Colvin, 5o Ohio St. 703, 36 N. E. 735 (1893); Clay v.
Selah V. I. Co., 14 Wash. 543, 45 Pac. 141 (1896); Win. D. Perkins & Co. v.
Diking Dist. etc., 298 Pac. 462 (Wash. 1931); Newton v. Earl of Egmont, 5 Sim.
130, 58 Eng. Rep. 286 (1832); Small v. Atwood, I Younge 407, 159 Eng. Rep.
1o51 (1832); 30 Cyc. 137; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §286;
STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (ioth ed. 1892) §120.
lnHartford Life Ins. C. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, L. R. A. 1916A.
765 (1915). 1"3 0 Cyc. 137. "24POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES, supra note 121.
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Those courts which demand the presence of a common interest
under the impracticable clause of the rule are as much at sea as to
what such common interest amounts to as they are when considering
the purport of that term when used in the other clause of the rule.
Thus we have many cases which make no attempt at definition.
Others define it as an interest in the facts and law,126 in the object of
the action and in the results to be accomplished, 26 in the grievance
and relief,127 in the subject of the controversy. 12  There are some
suggestions that there is the proper common interest only if all
interested could join.'129
A Fair Representation
We now turn our attention to other fields. The opinion of all who
have spoken of the matter is definite that persons actually suing in
class proceedings must fairly represent all those for whom they act.1 0
Some writers have gone further than merely to make this general
statement. It has been said that those appearing of record must be
shown to have an interest in the suit in harmony with those repre-
sented."' There is considerable law as to the number of thosewho
"Corey v. Sherman, 60 N. W. 232, 32 L. R. A. (Iowa 1894).
"'Fleming V. Mershon, 36 Iowa 413 (1873).
"'7Baldwin v. Hillsborough & C. R. Co., I Ohio Dec. 532, 2o West. L. J. 337
(1853); Mozley v. Alston, I Phil. 790,41 Eng. Rep. 833 (847).
12"Warfield-Pratt-Howell Co. v. Williamson et al., 233 Ill. 487, 84 N. E. 706
(19o8); Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swans. 277, 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (1818).
"'9Faber v. Faber, 7 6 S. C. 156, 56 S. E. 677 (1907); Fenn v. Craig, 3 Y. & C.
Ex. 216, i6o Eng. Rep. 68o (1838).
"'OSmith et al. v. Swormstedt et al., supra note 114; United States v.Coal Dealers'
Ass'n of California, 85 Fed. 252 (C. C.N. D.Cal. 1898); American Steel &Wire Co.
v.Wire Drawers, etc. Unions, go Fed. 598 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1898);Stevensv. Smith,
126 Fed. 706 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Evensonv. Spaulding, i5o Fed. 517 (C. C. A. 9th,
1907); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (S. D. Ohio, 2907); Spear et al.
v. H. V. Greene Co. et al., 246 Mass. 259, 24o N. E. 795 (1923); Van Vechten &
Sebring v. Terry et al., 2 Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y. 1816); Bouton v. Van Buren,
229 N. Y. 17, 127 N. E. 477 (1920); Commissioners of Sewers of the City of
London v. Gellatly, supra note iI; Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of
Railway Servants, (I9O2) A. C. 426; Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners'
Federation, (913) 1 Ch. 366; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2928) p. 278; 30 Cyc. 138;
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929)
§242; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (Ioth ed. 1892) §§ 207 and 116; 1 WHITEHOUSE,
EQUITY PRACTICE (1925) §59-
"'Sparks v. Robinson, I15 Ky. 453, 74 S. W. 176 (19o3); Overton v. Overton,
223 Ky. 311, 96 S. W . 469 (29o6); Russell v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 232 Ky. 820,
22 S. W. (2d) 289 (1929); Bardstown & Louisville R. R. C. v. Metcalfe, 4 Mete.
(Ky.) 199 (1862); Hubbell v. Warren, 8 Allen 173 (Mass. 1864); Wakeman v.
Grover, 4 Paige 23 (N. Y. 1832); Yarborough v. North Caroline Park Cm-
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must appear of record in a class proceeding. The rule is that a suffi-
cient number of persons must be of record to insure a fair representa-
tion of the class and to obtain a fair trial. 13 2 A few specific examples
may be of interest. One creditor was allowed to sue for numerous
(number not given) creditors to foreclose mortgages and secure all
the claims of the defendant's creditors."' One heir was permitted to
sue on behalf of twenty-eight heirs to have a trust, fund properly dis-
tributed." Two shareholders, it was held, could sue on behalf of all
shareholders (number not given)- to enjoin the issue of stock.1" 5 Two
citizens of a town properly represented all such citizens (number not
given) in a suit to force a railroad company to build its line within a
certain distance of the town."6 Two of those holding about $ioo,ooo
worth of county bonds were sufficient representatives of all the bond-
holders in an action on a bond given for their benefit in a proceeding
to enjoin the payments due thereunder, the injunction suit having
been finally dismissed.137 It has been decided that three policemen
could sue for about twenty-five policemen to recover sums due for
making arrests."" But three out of two hundred subscribers to a fund
to whom a circular concerning it had been sent before they subscribed
were said not properly to represent all of them for the facts as to the
subscriptions of those represented might not be similar to those made
to the persons suing.1" 9
mission, I96 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928); Quinlan v. Myers, 29 Ohio St. 500
(1876); Beecher v. Foster, 51 W. Va. 605, 42 S. E. 647 (1902); Frederick v.
Douglas Co., 96 Wis. 411, 71 N. W. 798 (1897); Burt v. British Nation Life
AssuranceAss'n, 4DeG. &J. 158,45 Eng. Rep. 62 (1859); Wolff v. Van Boolen,
94L. T. (N. S.) 502 (i9O6); 3o Cyc. 137.132McArthur v. Scott, I13 U. S. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. 652 (1885); Culley v. Elford,
187 Ala. 165, 65 So. 381 (19x4); Smith v. Williams, 116 Mass. 510 (1882); Branson
v. Industrial Workers of the World, 3o Nev. 270,95 Pac. 354 (19o8); Carpenter v.
Canal Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 (188o); Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ. v.
Toledo W. & W. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio N. P. 15, 5 S. and C. P. D. 14 (1894); Kealey
el at. v. Faulkner et al., 7 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 49, i8 Ohio Dec. 498 (907); Standard
Light & Power Co. v. Munsey, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 436, 76 S. W. 931 (i9O3); Stim-
son et al. v. Lewis et at., 36 Vt. 91 (1863); Dewey v. St. Albans Trust Co., supra
note 25; Adair v. New River Co., II Ves. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (i8o5); Powell
v. Wright, 7 Beav. 444, 49 Eng. Rep. 1,137 (x844); Weale v. West-Middlesex
Waterworks Co., I Jac. & W. 369, 37 Eng. Rep. 412 (1920); ARMSTRONG AND
DONAHUE, FLORIDA CHANCERY JURISPRUDENCE (1927) 62.
13Carpenter v. Canal Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 (188o).
1 4Smith v. Williams, 116 Mass. 510 (1882).
"3Lawson et al. v. Financial News Ltd. et al., 34 L. T. 52 (917).
luMacon & B. R. R. Co. et al. v. Stamps et al., 85 Ga. , II S. E. 442 (189o).
13 Alexanderv. Gish, 88 Ky. 13,9 S. W. 8oi (1888).
138Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 112, 7 S.W. (2d) 839 (3928).
'
89Churchill v. Whetnall, 87 Law J. Ch. 524 (1918).
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The proceeding, in order to be a class suit, must be on behalf of the
class. It is not sufficient that the plaintiffs bring an action merely
for their benefit.140 Nor can the proceeding represent any other than
the party named if such person is treated as a corporation.' 4' Where
a suit is brought on behalf on an unincorporated society, the parties
should be its individual members.142
Citizenship and Amount Involved
Let us next examine two problems which, though not peculiar to
federal courts, are most often considered in their printed reports.
It is almost always decided in representative suits that only the
citizenships of the parties to *the record are considered in determining
whether or not there is a diversity of citizenship. 43 One should notice,
however, that it has been held that a representative suit, the bill in
which failed to set forth the names and residences of the persons
represented, violated Federal Equity Rule 25, which provides that it
shall be sufficient that a bill in equity shall contain the full name,
when known, of each party, and the citizenship and residence thereof.
The court gave judgment for the defendant on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction of the suit.'"
There are opposing theories as to whether or not, in a class action,
the value of the interests of those suing and represented can be
aggregated to make up a jurisdictional amount. Cowell v. City Water
Supply Co. et al.41 very definitely claims, "Where a suit is brought by
1'"Castle et al. v. City of Madison et al., 1i3 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. I56 (1902);
Mozeley v. Alston, I Phil. 790 (1847); Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight S. S. Co.
Ltd., (1910) 2 K. B. 1021; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (Ioth ed. 1892) §126; I
WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE (1915) §59.
141COOPER, EQUITY PLEADING (x809) 40; EDWARDS, PARTIES IN CHANCERY
(1832) 40. In Irish Free State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit Co., 126 Misc. 269,212
N. Y. Supp. 421 (1925), it was said that the plaintiff could not sue as a state for
the benefit of persons who subscribed to the cause represented by it.
1POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 290.
'"Stewart et al. v. Dunham et al., II5 U.S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163 (1885); Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble e al., 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921); Putnam
etal. v. Timothy Dry Goods Co. etal., 79 Fed. 454 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1897); Alsopv.
Conway, z88 Fed. 568 (C. C. A. 6th, Ig1); Doan el al. v. Consolidated Progress-
ive Oil Co., 271 Fed. 12 (Del. 1920); Reagan v. Midland Packing Co. et al., 298
Fed. 5oo (N. D. Iowa, 1924); McGarry v. Lenz el al., 9 F. (2d) 68o (S. D. Ohio,
1925); Irwin et al. v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., i9 F. (2d) 300 (C. C. A.
7th, 1927).
1"State of Maine Lumber Co. el al. v. Kingfield Co. et al., 218 Fed. 902 (Conn.
1914).
412I Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3). Accord: Smithson v. Hubbell, 8i Fed. 593
(C. C. Wash. 1897); Orleans-Keener Ry. Co. v. Dunbar, 218 Fed. 344 (C. C. A.
5th, 1915); Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812 (W. D. Tenn. 1915); Grambling v.
Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931).
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one of a class on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
who may join in the proceeding, the sum or value of the matter in
dispute is the amount or aggregate value of the interests of those who
have joined in the suit. It is not the amount or value of the interest
of the entire class." This seems to represent the majority law, yet
one should notice that a few decisions oppose this view.48 The court
in Local No. 7 etc. v. Bowen et al.147 very confidently said, without
argument, ". . . it is clear that complainants' suit is a class or repre-
sentative suit, and it is well settled that in such suits the aggregate
interests of the whole class, and not the several interests of each
individual, constitute the matter in dispute." Of the two citations
given to support this view one of them is not a case of this type.148
The other one 149 is in accord and gives, as authority to sustain its
view, a quotation from a non-judicial writer.5 0 Professor Blume
believes that the joinder of amounts should be allowed, as that is the
fair result, for all members of the class represented "must be in the
same situation and alike interested in having the questions involved
in the case decided a particular way."' 5'1 ,
Allegations
At this point can best be discussed the allegations which have a
bearing on our problem and which must be made in the plaintiff's
original pleading. The best general statement concerning this matter
which the writer has discovered is found in McClelland v. Rose.5 2 The
court in that case says, "In order for a judgment or decree in a suit
to be binding upon others than those who are brought before the
court, it should be made to appear from the record in the case that
such a result is contemplated; that there are persons not before the
court having an interest in common with those who sue or defend,
and why such others are not brought in; and, further, the relation to
the subject-matter of the suit of those who sue or defend for others as
well as themselves should be disclosed as to present for the determina-
"'Carpenter et at. y. Knollwood Cemetery et at., 198 Fed. 297 (Mass. 1912);
Local No 7 etc. v. Bowen et at., 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex. 1922); Union Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. Milligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S. W. io8i (1917); Batman v.
Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 187 Ky. 659, 220 S. W. 318 (1920). (The last two
cases deal with state statutes and contain mere dicta on this point.)
"'Supra note 146.
"
5Herbert v. Rainey, 54 Fed. 248 (W. D. Pa. 1892).
114Carpenter el al. v. Knollwood Cemetery et al., supra note 146.
5'1 FOSTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (4 th ed. 19o9) p. 107.
"'Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits (1931) 15 MINN. L.
REv. 502-524.
152247 Fed. 721, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 341 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918).
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tion of the court the question whether they do or do not properly
represent, not only themselves, but others not before the court, who
are similarly concerned in the issues they raise or contest *** Where it
is fairly made to appear by the allegations of a bill that such an
adjudication is sought as will be effective, not only against those who
are brought before the court as defendants, but against others
similarly related to the subject of dispute, it is not necessary to aver
in terms that those who are made defendants are sued as repre-
sentatives of the class of which they are shown to be members,
especially when it is disclosed that those who defend contest the
plaintiff's claim by setting up the claim that the subject of the suit
belongs in common to an entire class which they admit does or may
include others besides themselves."'" In the various authorities
dealing with this point, as is true with those considering other proposi-
tions relating to our subject, very little reasoning is employed.
However, one judge says this is true so that the defendant may not
be charged with a double defense;M and another sustains the idea
so that those represented may all come in under the decree. 15
An action may, it is usually said, be treated as a representative
suit if the statement of the case and relief contemplated and prayed
for make it such in substance though there is no formal allegation
that it is brought for, or against, a class.'56 Nevertheless, it should be
IIn accord in principle with the holding down to the asterisks: McArthur
v. Scott, 113 U. S. 34o, 5 Sup. Ct. 652 (1884); Ball v. Bank of Bay Biscayne, 43
F. (2d) 214 (S. D. Fla. 1930); Whitney v. Mayo, 15 Ill. 251 (1853); Bardstown &
Louisville R. R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Metc. i99 (Ky. 1862); Reynolds v. Davis, 198
Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) x62 (I908); Spear et al. v. H. V.
Greene Co. et al., 246 Mass. 259, 14o N. E. 795 (1923); Brown v. Ricketts, 3
Johns. Ch. 553 (N. Y. 1818); Egberts v. Wood, 3 Paige 517 (N. Y. x832); Wood
v. Draper, 4 Abb. Pr. 332 (N. Y. 1857); Foster et al. v. Hackett, 112 N. C. 546,
17 S. E. 426 (1893); Males v. Murray et al., 7 Ohio N. P. 614, IO Ohio Dec. 373
(19oo); McClung v. Livesay, 7 W. Va. 329 (1874); BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRAC-
TICE, PARTIES AND FoRms UNDER THE CODE (4th ed.1932)§§8Ia and 8Id; DANIELL,
CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (6th Am. ed. 1894) 23; KINKEAD, LAW OF
PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2nd ed. 1898)
§15; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929) §287; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (Ioth ed. 1892) §I16; WATSON'S
WORKS' INDIANA PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND FORMS (4th ed. 1918-
1922); I WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE (1915) 94-95; 70 SOL. J. & R. io8o
(1926). l64Fish v. Howland, supra note 44.
15Brown v. Ricketts, 3 Johns. Ch. 553 (N. Y. 1818).
256Harmon el al. v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. x6x
(1887); Sourse et al. v. Marshall, 23 Ind. 194 (1864); Piedmont and Arlington
Life Ins. Co. v. Maury et al., 75 Va. 5o8 (i88I); Weld v. Bonham, 2 Sim. & S:
91, 57 Eng. Rep. 280 (1824); Eyre v. Cox, 24 Week Reptr., 2 Charl. Pr.
Cas. 283 (1876); BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER
THE CODE (4th ed. 1932) §81; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §298.
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remembered that designating oneself as suing on behalf of others
having a common interest with him does not make one to be so suing,
for the proper interest may not exist. 157 An allegation by the plaintiff
that he does not know how many others are situated similarly to him,
but that, on information and belief, he states there are many such,
has been held not sufficiently to set forth the existence of a large
enough class to permit a representative suit.158 It has been declared
that that portion of a complaint which attempted to show that a
representative suit was being brought was defective where the plain-
tiff said he sued on behalf of other creditors but failed to allege that
there were other creditors.15 9 It has even been held that when one
sues on behalf of himself and all others who shall join in the prosecu-
tion of the suit and contribute to the expenses thereof, he does not
sue under the representative statute, for the unnamed members of
the class interested are not parties to the suit, unless they elect to
come in, bear their portion of the expenses, and claim as such. 60 If
one goes through the cases, he will find that the courts, almost with-
out exception, allow representative actions based upon such an allega-
tion without saying anything one way or the other about it. Another
holding is to the effect that where one alleges that he sues for himself
and others of his class who intervene, he does not bring a class suit,
for parties who intervene can look after their own interests. 6 '
There is some authority that it should appear both in the title and
statement of claim that the action is brought on behalf of others than
those named, if that is the case;162 but the contrary result has also
been reached.'
Amendments are freely allowed to make a representative suit of
what originally appears to be an action on behalf of an individual.
Thus such amendments have been allowed at the hearing,16 4 and even
after decree. 15
7 0Oswald et al. v. Morris, 92 Ky. 52, 17 S. W. 167 (1891).
158Motley v. Southern Ry. Co., 184 Fed. 956 (N. D. Ga. i9il).
159Elwell and Post et al. v. Johnson, 3 Hun 558 (N. Y. 1875).
'
6
°Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ. v. Toledo etc. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio
N. P. I5, 5 S. and C. P. D. I4 (1894).
1'6 Fischer-Schein Syndicate v. Lee, 295 Fed. 485 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).
'
62Tottenham v. Tottenham, (1896) I Ch. 628, (1923) 87 Just. P. 543-44.
'6'Cochran v. American Opera C6., 20 Abb. N. C. 114 (N. Y. 1889); BATES,
NEw PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932)
§81d.
'"Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887).
"6Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) IO67 (i9O6).
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Parties to a Representative Suit
Although those represented in a class action are not technically
parties thereto,166 only those appearing by name holding that position,
they have been said to be before the court.167 They have also been
described as parties interested,1 8 quasi-parties,1"9 informal parties,7
inchoate parties, 71 and as persons having an inchoate right in the
suit.172 Their assent to the prosecution of the representative suit is
presumed,' 3 unless they show their disapprobation.T 4 They may, by
the clear weight of authority, become parties to the class action at
any time after it is begun. 76, Nevertheless, it has been decided they
can only come in under the decree, since, before that, they could
bring their own suits. 76 The usual practice is to require one wishing
to become a party of record to a representative proceeding to obtain
16Houston Cemetery Co. v. Drew, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 36 S. W. 802 (1896);
City of Dallas v. Armour & Co., 216 S. W. 222 (Tex. 1919); Bilmyerv. Sherman,
23 W. Va. 656 (1884); Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695 (1866); PHILLIPS, CODE
PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254; POMEROY, CODE PLEADING (5th ed. 1929) §293.
167Gieske v. Anderson, 77 Cal. 247, 19 Pac. 421 (1888); Stevens v. Brooks,
22 Wis. 695 (1866); STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (ioth ed. 1892) §99; PHILLIPS,
CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254.
"sCity of Dallas v. Armour & Co., 216 S. W. 222 (Tex. 1919).
16'Campbelletal v. Railroad Co. etal., Fed. Cas. No. 2366 (C. C. E. D. Tex. 1871);
Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court of Tulare Co., 182 Cal. 315, 187
Pac. IO56 (1920). 'Contra: Coann v. Atlanta Cotton Factory Co., 14 Fed. 4
(C. C. N. D. Ga. 1882).1 70Bilmyer v. Sherman, supra note 166.
17130 Cyc. 138.
172Woodgate v. Field, 2 Hare 211 (1842).
l73Flint v. Spurr, 56 Ky. 499 (1856); Oswald et al. v. Morris, 92 Ky. 48, 17 S. W.
167 (1891); Johnson v. DePauw Univ., 116 Ky. 671, 76 S. W. 851 (19o3); Kinney
and Dix v. Pocock et al., 8 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 121, 39 Ohio Dec. 354 (19o8);
White v. Carmarthen, etc. Co., I Hem. & M. 786, 71 Eng. Rep. 344 (1863);
BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4th
ed. 1932) §81c.
174Flint v. Spurr, supra note 173; Johnson v. DePauw Univ., supra note 173;
Tobin v. Portland Flouring Mills Co., 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743 (1902).
"'Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (C .C. W. D. Pa.
1891); Bogart et al. v. Southern Pac. Co., 29o Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923);
Duffy v. Duncan, 32 Barb. 587 (N. Y. 186o); Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y.
366, 5I N. E. 997 (1898); Whiting v. Elmira Industrial Ass'n, 45 App. Div. 349,
61 N. Y. Supp. 27 (4th Dept 1899); Kinney and Dix et al, v. Pocock et al., supra
note 96; Piedmont and Arlington Life Ins. Co. v. Maury et al., 75 Va. 5o8 (1883);
Kane v. Mann, 93 Va. 239, 24 S. E. 938 (1896); Dunlap v. Rauch et al., 24 Wash.
62o, 64 Pac. 807 (19O3); Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695 (1866); Day v. Bucking-
ham, 87 Wis. 215, 58 N. W. 254 (1894); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (sth ed. 1929)
§§293, 297, 298; 2 VAN SANTWOOD, EQUITY PRACTICE (1874) 154.
"6Mattison v. Demarest, supra note 13.
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a court order permitting him to do so,1 though the reports do not
often say it.
In actions such as are being described it is unimportant that some
of the named parties die or are infants or married women, for they
may be disregarded as unnecessary parties.17 8
Statute of Limitations
Since those represented in a class suit have an interest in it, it is
treated as a request for relief for them, as well as for the parties of
record, and the statute of limitations ceases to run against their
claims, and those of the named litigants, from the time the action is
begun. 79 It has also been held that the statute of limitations does not
run against represented plaintiffs during the continuance of a repre-
sentative action which is dismissed before decree, for it would be
attended with mischievous consequences to estates if every creditor
was bound to sue. °80
Control of Suit
Those who commence a representative action are ordinarily held
to have control of it until others have joined in the proceeding or a
-decree has been rendered therein.' This has been said to be true
because they act on their own motion and at their own expense.'u
17 7Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co.; Piedmont and Arlington
Life Ins. o. v. Maury ef al.; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §293, all
.supra note 175.
"18 Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477,5 S. W. 618 (i8go); Boddyetal. v. Kent et al.,
I Mer. 36I, 35 Eng. Rep. 707 (1816) (dictum); BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE,
PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932) §8Ib.
17 9Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887); Newgass et al. v.
Atlantic & D. Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 712 (E. D. Va. 1894); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick,
99 N. Y. 185, I N. E. 663 (1885); Barrick v. Gifford, 47 Ohio St. 180, 24 N. E.
259 (18go); Dunne et al. v. Portland St. Ry. Co., 40 Ore. 295, 65 Pac. 1052 (1901);
In re Chickering, 56 Vt. 82 (1883); Paxton v. Rich, 85 Va. 3 78, 7 S. E. 531 (1888);
Sterndale v. Hankinson, I Sim. 393, 57 Eng. Rep. 625 (1827); CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) p. 280; 30 CYc. 138.
. 'sSterndale v. Hankinson, supra note 179; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p.
279.
8'8 Hubbel v. Warren, 8 Alen 173 (Mass. 1864); Manning el al. v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 37 Misc. 215, 75 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1902); Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald,
.supra note 175; Woodgate v. Field, 2 Hare 211 (i842); BATES, NEW PLEADING,
PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4th ed. 1932) §8xe; 30 Cyc.
139.
182Handford v. Storie, 2 SiM. & S. 196 (1825).
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Thus, they may discontinue"' or settle184 the suit without the consent
of those represented. It has even been said that a defendant may
tender satisfaction due the representatives and compel them to
accept it, for, as far as power over the proceeding is concerned, it is
treated as an action between the parties named."" In fact, this idea
has been carried so far that it has been decided, in an action by one
judgment creditor on behalf of all such creditors to set aside a transfer
by the common debtor as fradulent, in case of the death of such
plaintiff, even after interlocutory decree, if before any other creditor
had proved his claim, the action could be continued only in the name
of the legal representative of the deceased. 1" 6 This, however, is but
one side of the picture. After judgment, the sole dominion over the
action by those named as parties is lost. 8 7 One reason given for the
distinction between the situation before and after judgment is that
prior thereto no other persons of the class than the plaintiffs of record
are bound to rely upon the diligence of those who instituted the suit.
Those represented may file their own suits, but after decree no second
action is permitted. 88 Another court has said that after judgment,
the decree being for the benefit of all members of the class, those repre-
senting the class lose absolute dominion of the proceeding. 89 Rven
rendition of interlocutory decrees has been said to result in a division
of control over the class proceeding among all involved. It has been
so decided where a legatee filed a bill for the benefit of all legatees
and a decree was made establishing the right of the plaintiff to re-
cover;" where the order in a creditor's suit against stockholders
declared the rights and liabilities of the various parties;"' and where
the intermediate decision in a creditors' bill against a debtor ordered
13Innes v. Lansing, 7 Paige 583 (N. Y. 1839); Tremain v. Guardian Mutual
Life Ins. Co., iI Hun 286 (N. Y. 1877); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185,
i N. E. 663 (1885); Beadleston v. Alley et al., 55 Hun 6o5, 7 N. Y. Supp. 747
(1889); MacArdell v. Olcott et al., 62 App. Div. 127 (Ist Dept. 19O1); Yost v.
Cowden, 7 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 73 (Pa. 1891); Day v. Buckingham, 87 Wis. 215r
58 N. W. 254 (1894); Handford v. Storie, supra note 182.
1841nnes v. Lansing, supra note 183; Mattison v. Demarest, supra note 176;
O'Brien v. Browning, 49 How. Pr. 1o9 (N. Y. 1875); Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick,
supra note 183; MacArdell v. Olcott et al., supra note 183; Day v. Buckingham,
supra note 183; Pemberton v. Topham, I Beav. 316,48 Eng. Rep. 962 (1838).
1"McDougald et al. v. Dougherty, ix Ga. 570 (1852).
18 8 'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184.
87Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick; Handford v. Storie, both supra note 183.
188 Handford v. Stone, supra note 183.
189Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, supra note 183.
'
90Collins v. Executors of Taylor et al., 4 N. J. Eq. 163 (1842).
"'Salisbury et al. v. Binghamton Pub. Co., 85 Hun 99, 32 N. Y. Supp. 65z
(1895).
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an accounting." 2 In the last situation the reason given for the result
was that, after the decree, the fund in issue was in the court's control.
The same result has been reached in a statutory proceeding to re-
strain the officers and agents of an insolvent bank from interfering
with its affairs and for the appointment of receivers. The receivers
having, apparently, been named and qualified, it was said that the
situation was similar to proceedings under a commission of bank-
ruptcy and that the original plaintiff could no longer discontinue the
action at his sole desire.19 3 A dictum also suggests that, when a
receiver has been appointed in a representative suit by a creditor for
an accounting by a debtor and the payment of his obligation, the
suit could not be dismissed without the consent of all the credit-
ors.
1 94
As soon as a represented plaintiff becomes a party of record, 9 5 or,
it appears, has even made a proper motion to become such,198 the
exclusive control of the action is lost to the original demandants, who
may, however, thereafter dismiss the suit as to themselves.197
Furthermore, we find some courts going to the extent of saying
that in certain cases of class actions those named never have complete
dominion over the proceedings. It has been declared that where a
creditor of a corporation sues on behalf of all creditors in an action to
enforce the liability of stockholders, the plaintiff cannot dismiss the
suit to the prejudice of the other creditors. The action was said to
deal with a situation unlike the ordinary representative suit, the
fund arising being for the benefit of all the creditors. 198 There was a
dissent.
We are also advised that Order XVI, Rule 9 of the English Rules
of Court will not permit a representative plaintiff to compromise the
rights of those whom he represents. Hence, still less, can he elect on
their behalf to take less than is admittedly due them. 9
At least one court has definitely said that those suing in a repre-
sentative capacity must so conduct the litigation that the interests
"'Yost v. Cowden, 7 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 73 (Pa. 189i); Sterndale v. Hankin-
son, supra note 179.
193Atlas Bank v. Nahant Bank, 23 Pick. 480 (Mass. 1839).
"'Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., supra note 175.
"'
9 Thouron v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. et al., 38 Fed. 673 (C. C. E. D.
Tenn. 1889); 30 Cyc. 139.
'Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., supra note 175; Manning
et al. v. Mercantile Trust Co., supra note I8I.
"97Piedmont and Arlington Life Ins. Co. v. Maury et al., supra note 175.
118johnson et al. v. Carpenter, Receiver, etc., ii Ohio C. D. 457, 21 Ohio C. C.
I68 (igoi).
'9In re Calgary and Medicine Hat Land Co., Ltd., (19o8) 2 Ch. 652.
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of all are protected and that neither by collusion nor inattention may
there be a failure to offer such preservation from loss. 2 0
Rights of Persons Represented to Sue
The usual conslusion is that persons represented in a class pro-
ceeding may bring similar suits20I prior to a decree therein, in which
they 'can receive as much relief as in any other action. 20 Grounds
given for this result have been that before the decree the plaintiff
may discontinue his action 03 and that those represented are not
bound to rely on the diligence of the demandant.2°4 As one might
expect, there are directly contrary holdings containing the ordinary
paucity of reasoning.2°5 One can also discover decisions taking a
middle course. Therefore, there is at least one court which says that
those represented may prosecute their own suits, if there is a lack of
diligence on the part of the plaintiff of record;2 6 and another one
gives similar permission unless the interested persons not named as
plaintiffs had notice of the suit and an opportunity to become parties.2 7
Though this right to sue exists before such a judgment, thereafter it
is ordinarily said to cease, °2 8 and actions commenced prior thereto
are suspended.20 It has also been determined that those repre-
200Farmers Loan andTrust Co. v. Lake St. El.R. R. Co., 68 Ill. App. 666 (I896).
01
rlnnes v. Lansing, supra note'183.
2 0 Coannv. Atlanta CottonFactory Co., 14Fed. 4(C. C. N. D. Ga. 1882); Innesv.
Lansing, supra note 183; Mattison v. Demarest, supra note 13; O'Brien v. Brown-
ing, supra note 184; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, supra note 179; Hirshfeld v,
Fitzgerald, supra note 175; MacArdell v. Olcott ef al., supra note 183; Yost v.
Cowden, supra note 183; Piedmont and Arlington Life Ins. Co. v. Maury et al.,
supra note 175; Woodgate v. Field, supra note I81; Handford v. Storie, supra
note 182; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p. 279.
21 3Woodgate v. Field, supra note 181.
2 4Handford v. Storie, supra note 182.
205Duffy v. Duncan, 32 Barb. 587 (N. Y. x86o); Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb.
598 (N. Y. 186o); Johnson et al. v. Carpenter, Receiver, etc., supra note 198;
In re Chickering, supra note 179; Shepherd v. Towgood, 1 Turn. & R. 379, 37
Eng. Rep. 1147.
20Kent's Adm'r v. Cloyd's Adm'r, 30 Gratt. 555 (Va. x878).
2 070'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184.
2081n re Hemiup, 2 Paige 316 (N. Y. 183o); Kerr et al. v. Blodgett el al.,
48 N. Y. 62 (1871); Travis v. Myers, 67 N. Y. 542 (1876); Hilton Bridge Const.
Co. v. Foster, supra note 69; Swan et al. v. Mansfield Coldwater & Lake Michigan
R. R. Co., 3 Ohio N. P. 225, 5 Ohio Dec. 297 (1896); Paxtlon v. Rich, supra note
179; Neve v. Weston et al., 3 Atk. 557, 26 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1747); Handford v.
Storie, supra note 182; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p. 280.
20 Mattison v. Demarest, supra note I3; O'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184;
Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, supra note I79; Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, supra note
175; McArdell v. Olcott, supra note 183; Stephenson v. Taverners, 9 Gratt. 398
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sented cannot intervene to oppose and nullify the representative
proceeding,210 for the plaintiffs suing by name have a right to prose-
cute it for themselves.211 On the other hand, those who do not come
in under such suit may settle out of court their part of the claim
involved therein .2 Indirectly connected with the points now being
discussed is a holding that when a creditors' suit against stockholders
is begun, no creditor can acquire a priority.21'
The Decree
Prior to the granting of a judgment, "When the allegation of a
general or common interest in many persons is denied, the duty de-
volves on the court to determine whether the common or general
interest exists ...,,14
A very definite majority holding is that decrees in representative
suits bind all who are represented,2 15 this being true of both plaintiffs
and defendants.216 Reasons given for the result are that it must be so
(Va. 1852); Kent's Adm'r v. Cloyd's Adm'r, supra note 206; Paxton v. Rich,
supra note 179.
2"0 Forbes v. Memphis, etc. R. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 4926 (C. C. W. D. Tex.
1872); Flint v. Spurr, supra note 173. 2"Flint v. Spurr, supra note 173.21Good v. Blewitt, I9 Ves. 336, 34 Eng. Rep. 542 (1815).
2'Wright v. McCormack, 17 Ohio St. 86 (1866).
n"Hill et al. v. Eagle Glass & Mfg. CO., 219 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
"'Smith et al.v. Swormstedt et al., supra note 1I4; Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S.
415, 27 Sup. Ct. 363 (19o6); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble et al., supra
note 143; McIntosh v. Pittsburgh, 112 Fed. 705 (W. D. Pa. igoi); McClelland v.
Rose, 241 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918), Ann. Cas. 1918C 34; Phipps et al. v.
Chicago, R. I. & R. R. CO, 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Roberts v. Kennedy,
13 Del. Ch. 133, z16 Atl. 253 (1922); Commonwealth v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 65
S. W. 596,55 L. R. A. 597 (goi); Bryant v. Russell, supra note 18; Kaufer v. Ford,
lOO Minn. 49, iiO N. W. 364 (1907); Dobbins et al. v. Coles et al., 45 AtI. 442
(N. J. 1898); Kerr v. Blodgett, supra note 2o8; Wood v. Draper, supra note
153; O'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184 (in case of judgment for the representa-
tive); Havemeyer et al. v. Brooklyn Sugar Refining CO., 26 Abb. N. C. 157, 13
N. Y. Supp. 873 (189o); Quinlan v. Myers, 29 Ohio St. 5o0 (1876); Herrick v.
Wardwell, 58 Ohio St. 294, 5o N. E. 903 (1898); Kinney et al. v. Pocock et al.,
supra note 96; Dewey v. St. Albans Trust Co., supra note 25; Paxton v. Rich,
supra note 179; Bilmyer v. Sherman, supra note 166; Linden Land Co. v. Mil-
waukee Elec. Ry. & Lighting Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N. W. 851 (19oo); Cullen v.
Duke of Queensberry, supra note 105;Weale v. West Middlesex Waterworks Co.,
supra note 132; Commissioners of Sewers of London v. Gellatly, supra note 112;
Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight S. S. Co Ltd., supra note 7i; BATEs, NEw PLEADING,
PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE (4 th ed. 1932) §8Ie; 30 Cyc.
140; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING (xothed. 1892) §120; (1923) 87 JUSTICE OF PEACE.
543. Contra: O'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184 (in cases against representative,
for until judgment those represented cannot interfere with the proceedings).
2"Commissioners of Sewers of London v. Gellatly, supra note 112.
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or the parties of record do not represent al 217 and -that the rights of
those represented rise.no higher than those of their representatives.2 1 8
Sometimes it is stated by inference,219 or directly,20 that those of a
class not named as parties, in a proceeding of the type with which
this paper deals, are not bound by judgments therein unless they
choose to be made parties thereto. One case is found which says the
general rule as stated above does not apply to an action brought on
behalf of those suing and of those others of the class involved who join
and contribute to the costs of the proceedings, since this is really not
a representative suit.21 This is apparently thought by the court to be
true, since it is not brought, in so many words, for the benefit of all
of the class, but only for those thereof who join therein and pay their
share of the costs. This surely is not the idea of the great majority of
courts, for in most representative actions the parties are so described
and all members represented are ordinarily held to be bound by the
decisions therein. Further, it has been declared that members of a
class who were not named parties in a representative action would
not be bound by a judgment, if they were prior to the decision with-
out knowledge of the pendency of the ease. Attention should be
called to a holding in which the court declared that a final judgment
in a representative suit upon a bond, wherein all claimants were
ordered by published notice to present their claims to the referee,
was binding upon all of those represented only when it provided that
no others than those appearing were entitled to recover. If this state-
ment were not a part of the decree, the others of the class interested
could sue, nothwithstanding the existence of the decision in the
representative proceeding.2 Nor should one fail to mention Dean
Clark's statement that, if there are proper safeguards present in
cases involving contingent interests of represented defendants, the
result of the suit as to such rights is conclusive against collateral
attack.n4 Let us also notice a definite ruling to the effect that a
t17Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Lighting Co., supra note 215.
218BATES, NEW PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER THE CODE
(4th ed. 1932) §81e.
219Fish v. Howland, supra note 44; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932)
§254.
22 0POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §297. This author also said that
those represented would be bound by a decree in a class suit, if they failed to
unite in the proceedings, they knowing of their pendency, and having an oppor-
tunity to join therein.
22 Adelbert College of Western Reserve Univ. v. Toledo etc. Ry. Co., supra
note I6O. nHolderman v. Hood, 70 Kan. 267, 78 Pac. 838 (19o4).
'Santilli v. Illinois Surety Co., 79 Misc. 6oo, 139 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1913).
2UCLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p. 282.
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decree in a class suit renders res adjudicata all questions within the
issues of the case whether formally litigated or not.,,,
Having considered the binding effect of decrees in class proceedings,
let us look at another aspect of them. The customary statement is
that the plaintiffs represented, as well as those named, in a repre-
sentative action may take advantage of a judgment therein.28 How-
ever, at least one decision is found in which this is held to be true only
when the proceeding is what the court calls a derivative action.
Examples of such suits are those by a stockholder in the right of a
corporation, or of a creditor in the right of a receiver, the object of
such actions being to realize a fund to be paid to the person in whose
right the plaintiff sues, thence to be distributed among those entitled
to share in it.2 7
In order that a represented plaintiff may take advantage of a
decree for the benefit of a class, it is usually said that he must ask the
court to allow him that privilege, 2 8 though Pomeroy, without giving
any examples, suggests that there may be cases of such a type that
the benefits necessarily inure to the advantage of all who may be
situated in the same position as the plaintiffs of record.29 We also
learn that where some creditors sue for all thereof for an accounting
of a trust fund, the trustees have no active duty to prove the claims
of the creditors represented2 0 Moreover, if those represented neglect
to come in under the judgment in a class proceeding, after reasonable
notice given to them for that purpose, the customary holding is that
2uHoward-Sevier Road Imp. Dist. No. I v. Hunt, supra note 57.
22 5Johnson v. Waters, In U. S. 64o; 4 Sup. Ct. 619 (1884); West v. Randall,
Fed. Cas. No. 17424 (C. C. R. I. 1820); Campbell el al. v. Railroad Co. et al.,
supra note 169; Forbes v. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., supra note 21o; Flash et al. v.
Wilkerson et al., 22 Fed. 689 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1885); American Steel & Wire
Co. v. Wire Drawers' etc. Unions, supra note 130; B yant v. Russell, supra
note 18; State v. Dist. Ct. et al, supra note 8I; Towner v. Tooley, supra note 205;
Mattison v. Demarest, supra note 13; Kerr et al. v. Blodgett et ai., supra note
2o8; Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, supra note 175; Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster,
supra note 69; Whiting v. Elmira Industrial Ass'n, supamnote 96; MacArdell v.
Olcott et al., supra note 183; Herrick v. Wardwell, 58 Ohio St. 294, 5o N. E. 903
(1898); Leigh v. Thomas, supra note 41; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) pp.
279-28o; DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (6th Am. ed. 1894) 230;
STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, (Ioth ed. 1892) §§99; IO6; VAN SANTWOOD, EQUITY
PRACTICE (1874) 154.
2TAthdns v. Trowbridge, 162 App. Div. 629, 148 N. Y. Supp. 181 (ist. Dept.
1914).
228Kvello v. City of Lisbon, 38 N. D. 71, 164 N. W. 305 (1917); Stevens v.
Brooks, 22 Wis. 695 (1866); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 295.
229Ibid. 23 Kerr v. Blodgett, supra note 208.
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they are barred from the benefits of the decree, unless therewas fraud
in the proceedings,2 1 though they are bound by it.2
Though, according to the orthodox view, judgment for costs in
a representative suit can only be obtained against the parties of
record,23 those represented who share the benefits of such an action
are indebted to those representing them for their share of the ex-
penses accruing therein.m When, by a representative action, there
is a fund preserved for the benefit of a class, these expenses are
deducted therefrom prior to its division among the successful liti-
gants,2S "not simply and alone because services have been rendered
which have been beneficial to the common interest, but upon the
ground that they were rendered by authority of those having the
common interest exercised by the representative, the compensation
for which was to be chargeable to the fund protected or recovered."2ns
Proceedings After Decree
Though there is little authority as to the effect of proceedings
in upper courts in the case of class actions, we do learn that, where
a defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs who
have sued by representation, there is an appeal as to the whole
class.2 7 We are also informed that, if a represented plaintiff is dis-
satisfied with an order of the trial court, which ruling is in favor
of the plaintiff of record, the proper action for the dissatisfied per-
23O'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184.
* mBryant v. Russel, supra note 18; Dobbins et al. v. Coles et al., supra note
215; Kerr et al. v. Blodgett et al., supra note 2o8; Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, supra
note 175; Fish v. Howland, supra note 44; Hallet v. Hallet, 2 Paige i5
(N. Y. 1829); Paxtonv. Rich, supranote 179; Stevens v Brooks, supra note 175;
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p. 28o; DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE (6thAm. ed. 1894) 230; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) §254;
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §293; STORY, EQUITY PLEADING
(ioth ed. 1892) §99.
23Britton v. Baker et al., 2 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 314, 14 Ohio Dec. 721 (1904);
Stevens v. Brooks, supra note 175; Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Kight S.S. Co. Ltd.,
supra note 7I; Price v. Rhondda, U. D. C. (1923) W. N. 228.
2"Whiting v. Elmira Industrial Ass'n supra note 96; Manning et al. v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., 37 Misc. 215, 75 N. Y. Supp. 168 (I9O2); Thompson v. Reno
Savings Bank et al., 19 Nev. 291, 9 Pac. 882 (1886); Central R. R. etc. Co. v.
Pettus et al., 113 U. S. 1I6, 5 Sup. Ct. 387 (1885).
=Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1882); Hand v. Savannah and Charles-
ton R. R. Co., 21 S. C. 162 (1883).
=Hand v. Savannah and Charleston R. R. Co., supra note 235.
37Britton v. Baker el al., supra note 233.
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son to take is not to appeal from the order, but to apply to the trial
court to be added as a defendant and then to ask, as such defendant,.
to get rid of the order, or to take the conduct of the suit out of the
,hands of the alleged representative plaintiff, if it can be shown
he does not really represent the wishes of the members of the class.
To hold otherwise, the court continues, would enable every per-
son in a representative suit to destroy its representative character
and to take up the matter for himself.B Further, we learn that
only parties of record can appeal a class proceeding,2 9 but a repre-
sented plaintiff may come in under the decree, not having previously
been a party of record, and show that the judgment is erroneous
or entitle himself to a rehearing.20
THE AUTHOR'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
Their Origin and Purpose
Our perusal of the authorities has been completed. Next let us
proceed to give a personal view of what the law should be under
the terms of the ordinary existing statute. To interpret any law
properly one must know its purpose; to understand that he must
be familiar with the law's history. In this case there can be no doubt
that the origin of the law of representative suits is equitable. The
general aim of equity was to make a nearer approach to just results
than could be done by the application of the more formal rules
of the law courts. Thus, some of the objects of equity practice
were to prevent a multiplicity of suits, to promote the convenience
of persons interested in litigation, and to avert delay in proceed-
ings. This must all be kept clearly in mind when one attempts to
construe the legislation now under consideration.
When the Statute is Applicable
The usual statutes providing for representative parties make no
distinctions between law and equity or tort and contract cases.
Therefore, they apply to all such suits.
To the writer, it seems clear that the doctrine of representative
suits should apply in, cases at law in federal district courts. The
conformity statute clearly covers the matter of parties and there
is no reason to make any exception in this type of case. Rather,
the tendency of the national courts has been to take a broad view
23Watson v. Cave (No. i), 17 Ch. D. i9 (88i).
90'Brien v. Browning, supra note 184.
UCampbell et at. v. Railroad Co. et al., supra note 169.
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of that law, except where it deprived them of jurisdiction. To
extend that legislation relating to conformity to this situation
would have the opposite effect. It may be suggested that except
in a very few cases at law, such as actions in ejectment, a law court
cannot effectively give the necessary remedy, and that when state
courts grant such a remedy in other cases they are really proceeding
-partly at law and partly in equity, and, therefore, neither side
of the federal court would have jurisdiction of such a representa-
tive proceeding. Such an action would be one for money damages
due those representing and those represented. As will be noticed
in another portion of this paper, some state courts allow such a
proceeding and others do not, the latter thinking a law court cannot
make an effective judgment in favor of the represented parties
in such a case. However, it should be noticed that the courts all
treat such cases as actions at law, and any mechanical device used
to enforce the money judgment for the benefit of those represented
is a matter of execution and does not change a typical action at law
into something else. This the writer believes is the correct view to
take. At this point the only question dealt with is as to whether
or not the federal courts should take cognizance of representative
actions at law, presuming they are permitted in state courts. Thus,
the problem dealing with the ability of a court of law to enforce
a money judgment in a representative suit is dealt with elsewhere,
for it is not peculiar to the law of representative suits in federal
courts, but would have to be answered whether the action were
brought in a state or national court.
Neither are plaintiffs singled out as the only parties in relation
to whom some may act for all of a class. Thus defendants, as well
as plaintiffs, may be represented. These statutes do not deal with
the creation or reduction of causes of action, for they are purely
remedial. They should be applicable to proceedings other than
the ordinary cases before a court, since they are easily employed
therein. Moreover, they are a part of the less formal procedure
that is growing up and it is fitting that they should be used in hear-
ings before commissions and similar bodies which are provided as
a means for escaping the formalism of the usual trial. One should
be allowed to make use of a representative statute where the mem-
bers of an unincorporated organization are parties, though a dif-
ferent legislative enactment provides that such members may sue,
or be sued, by an officer of such body, unless such other statute is
mandatory, for if it is permissive in its terms a choice of methods
of procedure is offered.
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Are the Statutes Mandatory?
Though the form of the legislation now being considered is per-
missive, it should also be remembered that its purpose is more
nearly to approach justice than one could if it did not exist. There
should, therefore, be no set rule-as to whether or not a representative
suit, where possible, should be brought. The court, or other body
taking its place, should determine this question. It should be al-
lowed to require a preliminary hearing on this matter. No appre-
ciable delay in the case would be necessary in most instances if the
court decided that a proceeding which had not been brought as a
class action should proceed as such, since usually the parties already
in the suit would properly represent the class. If this were not
true, a reasonable time should be allowed to add such parties. If
a representative action had been brought and the court thought
that such procedure was improper, it could order the form of the
proceeding changed and there need be no further delay. It may
be suggested that the choice of bringing, or not bringing, a class
action lies only with the plaintiff. The answer is that the statute
does not say so.
"A Question of Common or General Interest of Many Persons"
This phase of the law has caused more trouble than any other
portion thereof and has led to all conceivable results. One can-
not find any outstanding weight of authority as to its proper inter-
pretation. The writer believes it should be given the broadest
possible meaning. It is not difficult to decide what a "common
or general interest" means. It deals with an interest that is of
universal concern within the limits of the reference, that is, in this
case, a concern of all who represent and are represented. The sug-
gestion that "common or general" means "united" is incorrect,
for there are statutes making joinder mandatory where interests
are united, whereas this legislation is not mandatory. However,
those having a united interest should be permitted the use of a
representative action, for in such a proceeding the whole class is
involved. The difficulties come in deciding what is meant by "ques-
tion" and "many". In what kind of "question" mustthe necessary
interest exist? There is nothing in the applicable legislation that
definitely answers the question. However, in the statutes relating
to joinder of parties and actions and to counterclaims the term
"subject of the action" is used, while in those dealing with repre-
sentative suits it is not employed. This indicates that the "ques-
tion" does not refer to the subject of the action. This being true,
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it is not essential that plaintiffs to a representative suit must be
persons who can be joined under the ordinary joinder statute, for
such people must have an interest in the "subject- of the action".
Because of this and the further facts that there are no other statutes,
in addition to the one under investigation, which bear on the matter,
that this one says nothing definite in relation to our problem, that
there is no compellingly large number of authorities giving a single
construction to the words involved, and that the purpose of the
statute is to aid in our search for fair results, the writer believes
that the question in which the common interest must exist consists
of the basic facts and law of the case. This permits an extensive
joinder of parties and, at the same time, if those involved in a suit
are interested in the underlying facts and law therein the proceed-
ing will be kept within a reasonable sphere of inquiry. If the common
concernment were essential only in questions of law, the courts
would be compelled to consider unwieldy mixtures of fact situations.
In reaching a conclusion as to the-meaning of "many" as found
in this division of the law, one must look at the statute in its entirety.
It will be recalled that in form the statute is generally separated
into two parts. The first division of the usual enactment allows a
representative suit when the question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons, and the second portion permits a class action
where the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court. If one considers' merely the form of the law,
a class proceeding may be commenced if there is a question of
common interest to "many", but if there is no such interest it
is essential that the parties to a representative action be numerous,
and that it be impracticable to bring them all before the court.
As has been shown, many authorities have tried to interpret the
statute in this way and have attempted to tell when there were
"many", and when there were "numerous", persons involved. It
is maintained that this cannot properly be done. No matter how
many members there are in a class, a representative suit should not
be allowed under the law being considered unless there is a proper
question in which they all have a common interest. To conclude
otherwise would result in permitting innumerable unconnected
questions of law and facts to be dealt with in a single suit. Though
numerous courts have, in words, said this codd be done, in fact
they have not permitted it. The practical, and proper, result of
almost every decision has been to treat the statute being interpreted
as consisting of a single part to the extent of demanding that every-
one representing and represented should have a common interest
PLURAL LITIGANTS IN CLASS SUITS
in some question. Then, improperly, a large number of courts,
not realizing, apparently, that they have done it, have proceeded to
distinguish between many persons and parties so numerous that it
would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. The right
way to translate this enactment is to say that there can be a repre-
sentative suit only where there is a class of persons having a common
interest in certain questions of law and facts, which individuals
are so numerous that, under the peculiar circumstances, it would
result, on the whole, in injustice not to allow such a proceeding.
Whether or not such a situation exists should be left to the court
before whom the case comes.
A Fair Representation
Of course there must be enough parties of record who are con-
cerned with the same questions of law and facts as are those whom
they represent so that all involved will have their interests properly
cared for. Just when that situation does, or does not, exist should
be for the court to decide, for it alone could act in an unbiased man-
ner. The action should be on behalf of the class, for otherwise its
members are not represented.
Citizenship and Amount Involved
In those suits in which, to give a court jurisdiction, there must
be a peculiar type of citizenship, the writer believes the tribunal
should have authority to determine the cause, if the parties of record
have the necessary citizenship. He thinks this because such a view
will eliminate lawsuits and will, at times, make possible a remedy
which might otherwise not exist. If a different decision were reached,
persons might effectively manage their citizenship so that there
never could be a suit upon a just claim, and one should again recall
that the purpose of the law in question is to help in approaching legal
justice.
One should be permitted to aggregate the amounts due members
of a class in case of a representative suit in which a certain sum has
to be in issue to give the court jurisdiction. By allowing this practice,
a reduction in the number of court actions results. Such reduction
is one of the ideals of equity procedure and of the present trend in
adjective law, of which the rule allowing representative suits is a
part. It should not, moreover, be forgotten that the parties plaintiff
to a class action must have a common interest in the questions
involved, even though their concern in the matters touched upon
in the suit need not be united. Thus, one is not, in allowing this
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aggregation of amounts claimed, permitting such joinder of sums by
persons with unrelated interests.
Allegations
The best way for the plaintiff to draft his original pleading in a
representative suit is to indicate in its title and in its body that
he is commencing such an action and to set forth in the first part
of the statement of the case all of the facts essential to the bringing
of such a suit. He should show that there are so many persons,
plaintiff, defendant, or both, having a common interest in certain
facts and law that it would be unfair to demand that they all become
actively engaged in the proceedings, or that they should each be
served with a process. It should likewise be made to appear that
the class involved is fairly represented by those who are parties
of record. It must be made clear that such parties have an interest
in common with those represented. There should be no uncertainty
as to any of these matters, but the spirit of the statute in question
demands that it should suffice if these elements of a representa-
tive suit are substantially set forth. The request for relief should
be for the benefit of all members of the class. A failure to show
in the title that a class suit is being brought should not be fatal,
for that is merely a formal error. Of course, the ordinary amendment
statutes apply to pleadings in cases of the nature under discussion,
for they are general enactments. It is, properly, insufficient to say
one sues on behalf of others, where no others are shown to exist,
for there is no allegation that there is a class for whom an action
can be brought. Also, to allege that one sues on- behalf of himself
and others who shall join in the prosecution of the suit is incorrect,
for a representative action is brought on behalf of, or against, all
of the class, whether they are, or are not, active in the conduct of
the proceeding.
The reasons that one should draft his pleading as suggested are
that this type of proceeding is a special one, and in such cases one
must affirmatively show in his pleading that he has a right to bring
it. Then, too, if one did not indicate that he was bringing a repre-
sentative suit, judgment could not be rendered for, or against,
those of the class who were not parties of record.
Parties to a Representative Suit
Though technically only parties of record in a class. action are
the parties thereto at any particular time, those represented are
really suing or being sued. Therefore, properly by court order,
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they may become parties thereto at any time after the representative
suit is begun, and it is incorrect to say that they can become parties
only after decree. It should be clear that the death of a member
of the class involved or any disability of one in such a group, includ-
ing residence or citizenship, which makes him unavailable as a
party, does not abate, or destroy the efficacy of a representative
proceeding. This is true because one of the reasons for permitting
such an action is that frequent deaths, changes of residence or
domicile, and other disabilities of members of the class would un-
duly delay the obtaining of justice, or, perhaps, entirely thwart
those interested from suing successfully, if this method of procedure
were not available.
Statute of Limitations
Bringing of a representative suit properly stops the running of
the statute of limitations against the claims of those represented as
well as against the rights of those who are parties of record. This
must be so, for otherwise one could not truly say that the action
was brought on behalf of the entire class concerned. If such a suit
is dismissed, the running of the statute should be treated as in abey-
ance during its pendency. If this were not done, an unscrupulous
person could easily create a bar against the bringing of actions by
other members of a class.
Control of Suit
It is right, in general, there being no statutory law to the contrary,
that those suing as representatives in a class action should have
control of the proceedings until some of those represented are made
parties of record, or until judgment, for they, up to that point, are
the active parties to the proceeding. As soon, however, as new per-
sons become named parties, they should share in the direction of
the method of continuing the proceeding. On the other hand,
they should not keep those who commenced the action from with-
drawing therefrom and settling any individual claims, if by so doing
the interests of others were not injured, since one should have
control over matters between himself and another in relation to
which no third person is involved.
Throughout the proceeding, however, it is fair, in order to protect
the parties represented, that the court should, where necessary,
direct proceedings so that this protection may be effected.
Those suing should, as long as they continue the action, act
fairly for the benefit of the whole class which they represent.
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If there are several who are representing a class, all of which
representatives do not agree as to the proper way in which to conduct
their part of the representative suit, the local law as to the control
of a proceeding in which there are several parties, defendant or
plaintiff, who are not in accord as to the proper steps to take, should
apply, it being remembered thati the action must be in good faith
as far as it relates to those represented. The court should be per-
mitted to interfere and order that different action be taken, if it
learns that such good faith is not being exercised.
Rights of Persons Represented to Sue
Since one of the purposes of a representative suit should be to
avoid a multiplicity of actions, those represented should not be
permitted to bring separate proceedings to enforce their rights
involved in the class action. This is not unfair to them, as they
may become parties to the representative action and help manage it.
The elimination of court proceedings is more important than that
each person concerned should have the sole control of the action
involving his claim. If he has not had notice of the bringing of the
class action and has proceeded to trial in his individual case, there
being no judgment rendered in the representative suit, it may be
that the best interests of all concerned would be served by con-
tinuing his proceeding to judgment. Whether or not that is true
should be left to the discretion of the court before whom the ques-
tion arises. If the interests of the others of a class will not be in-
jured by one or more of its members settling their claims outside
of court, they should be permitted to do so
The Decree
A decree in a class proceeding should be so worded as to cover
all of the members thereof and should bind each one of them, unless
some unusual situation should arise which makes such a result unfair.
A condition of that nature would be unusual and the judge granting
the decree should be the one to decide whether or not it exists. The
reason for the general rule is that, if the decree did not affect all
concerned, the suit would not really be a representative proceeding.
Though it is better formally to bring a representative action for the
benefit of all of a class, if it happens to be commenced "for those
who join and contribute to the costs of the suit," the decree should,
nevertheless, bind all members of such class. This is true, since
any representative suit should be treated as being brought for the
benefit of the whole class, because the law should provide that all
PLURAL LITIGANTS IN CLASS SUITS
members of the class are to be treated as parties and should be forced
to contribute to the expense of the proceeding, unless they settle
separately and properly before judgment. Thus, whether in so many
words, one brings a representative suit for all members of a class,
or for those thereof who join and contribute to its costs, he practically
does the same thing. He commences it for everyone involved and
each one of them must pay part of the costs thereof. Knowledge
of the pendency of the suit, or lack thereof, on the part of those
represented should make no difference in the effect of the judgment,
for their interests are being dealt with whether they know of it or
not, which interests it is the duty of the parties of record, and of
the court, to protect.
Since the decree should bind all members. of the class involved
in a representative suit, each one of them must have a right to his
proper share in the relief recovered thereby, for otherwise he would
have to bear the burden of obligations without having the benefit
of the correlative rights. This would clearly be unjust. Reasonable
notice of the rendition of the judgment should be given to all mem-
bers of the class, and they should be given ample opportunity to
present their claims whenever there is any uncertainty as to what
those rights are. If it is clear just what is due under the decree to
those who have been represented, the court can provide for their
obtaining that which is justly theirs, even though their whereabouts
is not known at the time of the rendition of the judgment. But
what can be done when there is a set sum to be divided equally
among all those who are members of the class interested and the num-
ber of those who are to receive a portion of the fund is not known?
The fairest procedure seems to be to order a published notice of the
rendering of the decree, in which the facts involved should be set
forth fully enough so that one having a claim to the fund can recog-
nize, by the reading of the notice, that he has an interest in the decree.
All concerned should be given a reasonable time, to be set by the
court, for them to establish their claims. If, after judgment, but
prior to the division of the fund mentioned, the existence of definite
members of the represented plaintiffs becomes known for the first
time to any party to the class suit, or to the judge hearing it, personal
notice of the decree should be given the newly discovered person.
Any loss occasioned by failure to give such a notice should be borne
by the party or judge through whose fault the loss was occasioned.
After that period has elapsed, a division among those of the class
whose existence has come to the court's attention should be proper.
Prior to that time, a partial distribution might, under peculiar cir-
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cumnstances, be permissible, but the court 'should be very cardful
before taking such a step. An apportionment made after due notice
should be final. One could argue that even thereafter those who
received the fund should be proportionately liable to newly discovered
members of the class for what they would. have received if they had
applied for a share of the proceeds of the suit before the division
thereof. That would be unjust unless a fair and definite time were
set by statutory law or order of court within which a claim could be
made, for one should, otherwise, reasonably think that he can dis-
pose of his share of the fund which he has received without having to
give a portion of it back to someone else.
Costs
To the writer, it seems clear that those members of a class who do
not appear as parties to a representative action, but who obtain the
benefits thereof, should'be liable for their proportionate share of its
expenses to the named parties, for one should not receive the benefits
of a judgment without bearing some of the burdens of the proceeding
resulting in the decree. Moreover, since this is a representative
action, those represented should be liable to their opponents for
costs assessed in favor of the latter. This is true because the parties
of record should be treated as proceeding on behalf of all members of
the class concerned. If a fund is obtained for the class, the reasonable
expenses of procuring it are properly deducted therefrom before its
distribution, since it would be unjust to demand that those who had
made the expenditure initially should have to depend on the promise
of each member of the class in order to be recompensed for their
outlay.
Proceedings After Decree
Any steps taken after judgment by, or against, those representing
a class should bind all members thereof. Those who have previously
been represented, but who have not become parties of record until
after a decree, should, subsequently, have a share in the control of
any proceeding occurring later.
A Proper Statute
Ordinarily, the writer would not care to suggest a statutory form
to cover a legal situation, for he does not like to see the law put in a
straight-jacket. However, the condition of the enactments and other
authorities relating to class suits of the type dealt with in this paper
is very unsatisfactory. It is, therefore, permissible to make any sug-
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gestions that may result in the improvement thereof. It is thought
that this betterment can, under the circumstances, be effected only
by means of a definite statute or rule of court. He, therefore, suggests
the following enactment to cover the matter of class suits in which
the number of persons involved plays a part. If possible, it shouldbe
in the form of a rule of court, so that any defects in it could be readily
remedied. The suggested wording is as follows: When among a class of
persons so numerous that to make them all parties of record would be
impracticable, there is a common interest in the facts and law which are
the basis of a cause of action or defense, the court, in its discretion, may
permit one or more of such a class of persons to sue or be sued as repre-
sentatives of such class. This enactment shall apply to all types of pro-
ceedings. When the jurisdiction of a court is dependent upon the citizen-
ship of the parties to a class action, only the citizenship of the original
parties of record thereto shall be considered. Where jurisdiction of a
court is dependent on the fact that a certain sum is involved, the amounts
due the members of a class may be aggregated. The bringing of a repre-
sentative action shall stop the running of any statute of limitations
applicable to the claim sued upon in favor of all members of the class, and
if the suit should be dismissed without decree, the statute shall be in
abeyance between the times when the action was begun and dismissed.
The parties of record shall have control of a class suit, subject, however,
to the supervision of the court. After a representative action is commenced,
no other proceeding relating to the same cause of action shall be permitted
during its continuance. All decisions of trial and appellate courts in such
proceedings shall bind each member of the class concerned, unless such
decisions are made to apply only to particular persons. Each member of
a class shall be liable to pay his share of the costs of a representative
proceeding in proportion to the amount of his recovery or liability.
Though the suggested enactment is comparatively long, it is be-
lieved that its length is justified if its adoption would mean the elim-
ination of useless and expensive litigation.
